8 ms·
>> These attacks leak information through micro-architectural side-channels which we show are not mere bugs, but in fact lie at the foundation of optimization.
by phkahler 8y ago
>> These attacks leak information through micro-architectural side-channels which we show are not mere bugs, but in fact lie at the foundation of optimization.
So we'll need to have non-speculative execution for cloud CPUs and stronger efforts to keep untrusted code off our high performance CPUs. This may even lead to chips with performance cores and trusted cores.
- bediger4000 8y agoProcessor affinity would become a security-influenced decision with a CPU like that. That would allow for a whole new class of bugs.
- phkahler 8y ago>> Processor affinity would become a security-influenced decision with a CPU like that. Yes it would. >> That would allow for a whole new class of bugs. I think it's necessary, but not easy. Actually what I think is necessary is for people to stop running code from random places - or even common places. Google could work without running stuff on my machine.
- bunderbunder 8y agoI'm curious if this leads to us re-visiting more Itanium-like CPU designs.
- Tuna-Fish 8y agoNo, it won't, because OoO with process isolation is still superior to Itanium-like in all respects.
- yardstick 8y agoI hope they still offer CPUs optimised for the non Cloud scenario, where all the programs running are trusted and so these sorts of attacks (which requires local access) are not applicable.
- msbarnett 8y agoOutside of some very niche scenarios, does this usecase even exist? Certainly nothing running a javascript enabled browser, electron app, or in general any VM of any sort qualifies.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 8y agoAll the VMs run on my employer's servers are running code we trust. None of them run arbitrary code from some third party, because we're not a cloud provider, nor are they used to browse the web. I don't want to slow them down to mitigate vulnerabilities that just aren't a serious risk or even applicable.
- pjmlp 8y agoDo you guys audit the whole stack then?
- berkut 8y agoMost HPC stuff likely (in my experience) fits this scenario.
- msbarnett 8y agoSure. I’m comfortable describing HPC and on-premises fully trusted computing (another response) as “very niche scenarios” though (compared to the much much much larger markets of large cloud farms on the server side, and consumer devices), to the point where I have to wonder whether or not it’s worth it for CPU vendors to cater specific SKUs to them without the silicon mitigations.
- jcelerier 8y agoany art creation workflow ? e.g. music, video production, 3d modeling & rendering, etc...
- _jal 8y agoFor some types of work, it means there's still a case for on-prem/"private cloud". Pick two: performance, safety, convenience.
- Tuna-Fish 8y agoNo. The paper notes that Spectre can, and will in the future be able to defeat all programming language level techniques of isolation. With properly designed OoO, Spectre cannot defeat process isolation. The fundamental lesson that everyone must take to heart is that in the future, any code running on a system, including things like very high-level languages running on interpreters, always have full read access to the address space of the process they run in. Process isolation is the most granular security boundary that actually works. Or in other words, running javascript interpreters in the same address space as where you manage crypto is not something that can be done. Running code from two different privilege levels in the same VM is not something that can be done. Whenever you need to run untrusted code, you need to spin up a new OS-managed process for it.
- downer52 8y agoExcept there was a time before this class of exploitation. And so, now, there cannot be a time after? Doubtful.
- elihu 8y agoWhat about languages that prevent the program from reading the current time or determining whether some local computation finished before or after some external event? (I'm thinking of something like Haskell code that's executing outside of the IO monad.) Perhaps we just need to have a more restricted idea about what untrusted code is allowed to do.
- gizmo686 8y agoIn concept this could work. In practice, you bassicly need to design the language (or at least compiler and runtime) with this in mind from the beggining, otherwise you might forget about some backdoor. Eg, if you do Haskell and just verify the function you are running is not in the IO monad, you might miss some usage of UnsafePerformIO. Even if you check their code, if you let them specify dependencies they might manages to sneak a buggy use of UnsafePerformIO into a library they submitted to hackage. Plus, your restriction is essentially: no clock, no contact with the outside world, no threading, and a carefully considered interface to the host program to prevent time leaks. For many usecases, this is not workable