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Incompleteness ex Machina – proving Gödel's theorems in terms of algorithms [pdf]
- imh 8y agoI never understood the step about how a system that can do basic arithmetic can express the "I am not provable in F" sentence. Does anyone have an ELI30 version of that?
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- bvirus 8y agoI’m not a mathematician, but the ELI30 version I got was that certain logical statements are labeled by certain number, such that doing arithmetic with those numbers corresponds to basic logical operations. So true statements about the number labels equal equivalent statements about the logical statements labeled by those numbers. So like, if 1 represents some logical statement and 2 represents some logical statement, and 3 represents another, then 1+2=3 is the same as saying that the two logical statements labeled by 1 and 2, when combined, produce the logical statement labeled by 3. This idea is called Gödel numbering, and Wikipedia says “In formal number theory a Gödel numbering is a function which assigns to each symbol and formula of some formal language a unique natural number called a Gödel number (GN). ... A Gödel numbering can be interpreted as an encoding where a number is assigned to each symbol of a mathematical notation, and a stream of natural numbers can then represent some form or function.” That seems to sort of gel with what I heard, although it implies that maybe arthimetic operations like +, or -, aren’t actually involved. It might be more like 1 is a statement, and 2 is a statement, such that 12 is a combination of those two statements. The point is that then you encode “this statement is not proveable” into numbers and show that you get a numerical contradiction (like 1=3 or something).
- neokantian 8y agoIt is not about systems that can "do" basic arithmetic but that can "talk about" basic arithmetic. The mere execution of basic arithmetic does not require the capability of manipulating propositions of basic arithmetic. Doing basic arithmetic: 12 * ( 5 + 8 ) --> 12 * 13 --> 156 Talking about basic arithmetic: a * ( b + c ) == a * b + a * c The formal language needed to describe basic arithmetic is much more powerful than a simple execution engine, such as a stack engine, that can merely carry out basic arithmetic. For example, I must be able to express that for all natural numbers x and y, if x = y, then y = x. The result could look like this: ∀ x,y ∈ N: x=y ⇔ y=x Hence, this language must be able to express all Dedekind-Peano's axioms as well as every proposition provable from these axioms, along with their formal proofs. In that sense, the Gödel numbering system is the "bytecode" of quite a serious programming (or at least, specification) language. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del_numbering https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del_numbering)
- rocqua 8y agoIt should be noted that the special sauce that makes arithmetic really difficult is induction. Induction isn't just reasoning about computation, (i.e simple equations). Instead it is reasoning about reasoning about equations (i.e. reasoning about all equations). Specifically we have: this formula https://wikimedia.org/api/rest_v1/media/math/render/svg/67e20a414c6f0eb6af309ddbe2bcee1391b3d0ea https://wikimedia.org/api/rest_v1/media/math/render/svg/67e2...
- salthound 8y agoBut it should be pointed out that induction is essentially unrelated to Gödel's theorem. For example, Robinson Arithmetic is a finitely axiomatized theory whose axioms contain only one existential quantifier, but just like full (Peano) arithmetic, it is subject to Gödel's incompleteness theorems.
- rocqua 8y agoWow, I thought it was required to have second order logic for godel to apply, but this seems to be a first order logic that is still undecidable.
- ratmice 8y agoFrom the other side of the fence, another thing to look at would be the decidability of presburger, and skolem arithmetic, the following paper then goes over the extensions of these, which render the result undecidable. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.2.2136 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.2.21...
- imh 8y agoThanks for the answer! Out of curiosity what about systems we can prove able to "do" basic arithmetic, ignoring whether they can talk about it? I'm imagining the difference between a system that can show "P(n)" for any n, rather than a system that can show "P(n) for any n." It seems like the former must come with a proof about the system. The quantifiers "for any n" have to come somewhere. If they aren't embedded within the system, do we still end up with a system that must be able to express "This sentence is not provable?"
- empath75 8y agoThe general idea is that if you have a logical system that can reason about numbers, if you figure out a way to encode the operators of the system itself as numbers, you can reason about the system itself within the system.
- lisper 8y agoNowadays it's pretty simple: 1. Encode the propositions of your formal system in ascii (or whatever encoding you like) 2. Observe that the resulting bit patterns can be interpreted as numbers, and so the rules of inference of your formal system can be expressed as mathematical operations on those numbers 3. Profit Goedel had to invent all of that from scratch. On top of that, he had to describe how to actually carry out step 2 without the benefit of a programming language. All he had to work with was raw math. So his encoding was very different from ascii, or anything you are familiar with, because it was "optimized to run on raw math" rather than a digital computer.
- NotAnEconomist 8y ago> Godel was programming the integers. That is that. And he didn’t even know it at the time; truly impressive. It seems strange to say that Godel didn't know it at the time -- Godel's work was part of the effort to mechanize logic, Hilbert's program, and the axiomatization effort started in response to contradictory calculus theorems, and followed Frege, Russel, Whitehead, et al. Or rather, Godel's work showed that Russel's efforts to create a consistent and complete foundation for mathematics was fundamentally insufficient. Turing extended this work, by providing an explicit model of a calculating machine, to show that no algorithm could effectively determine the truth -- even without providing a proof -- locking the door on Hilbert's program that Godel had slammed shut. Regardless, the entire point of Godel's work was exploring the relationship between our ability to "reason" and our ability "calculate" or "perform rote tasks". (Missing details of the narrative aside -- it was a really good read.)
- martinlaz 8y agoAny chance OP is referring to "integer programming" (aka discrete optimization), which came about 20 years later?
- atq2119 8y agoNo. Integer programming in the operations research sense is "just" solving linear optimization problems with the constraint that the solution variables need to be integer. In particular, IP doesn't really involve the multiplicative structure of the integers, which is crucial for how Gödel proved his results. Also, I'd point out that while there's significant overlap between integer programming and discrete optimization, they're not the same thing. Integer programming is one tool used in discrete optimization among many.
- fnrslvr 8y agoAdding to atq2119's answer, integer programming is merely NP-complete. You really need full Turing computability to get the incompleteness results. The set of provable consequences of Peano arithmetic is RE-complete, and we know that NP != RE, so you definitely can't give an integer program that verifies that a formula is provable from PA, which is a necessary ingredient.
- soberhoff 8y agoAuthor here. I'd like to mention that this article is currently slated for publication in the Bulletin of the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science. A revised draft can be found at: https://github.com/SOberhoff/incompleteness_ex_machina/releases/download/v1.3/incompleteness_ex_machina.pdf https://github.com/SOberhoff/incompleteness_ex_machina/relea... I haven't handed it over yet, so we'll have to see about further changes.
- triska 8y agoThat's a very nice writeup, thank you a lot! One thing that seemed a bit surprising to me, especially in light of the paper's strong focus on computation, is that the assumption that the axiomatization is effective is only mentioned in a footnote, and even there it is not explained but we are told to "don't worry about it" if we don't know what that means. Yet, the code pieces in the paper make critical use of this assumption in that they assume that we can decide (with an algorithm) whether or not a string is a proof. This only works if the axioms are recursive. So, maybe you could consider adding a short explanation about this to the paper?
- soberhoff 8y agoEvery time I said "either/or" I was making use of the law of the excluded middle. But I didn't add a detailed disclaimer explicitly highlighting this fact either. Should I have? I think it's okay to just take some things for granted. Though, I admit that I have never spent much thought on non-effective axiomatizations. So I'm open to be educated.
- triska 8y agoThe proofs you present are entirely constructive and work without appealing to the law of the excluded middle! As was also pointed out by Gödel himself about his proofs, they are obtained in an "intuitionistically unobjectionable manner". When you say "either/or" in the paper, you make case distinctions that are intuitionistically non-contentious, i.e., you say "either F ⊢ G, then contradiction, so F ⊬ G, or F ⊬ G, then contradiction etc.", but the point is that G is explicitly constructed, so this is intuitionistically acceptable. In contrast, the other assumption I mentioned is used in the paper and in fact essential for its proofs.