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The Intel response seemed odd. They say you need to only run software from trusted sources. But if we only run trusted software the need for the enclave goes aw
by phkahler 8y ago
The Intel response seemed odd. They say you need to only run software from trusted sources. But if we only run trusted software the need for the enclave goes away. The only use then is for running code on a machine you dont trust. In the cloud.
- ENOTTY 8y agoThe computing model enabled by SGX (and other mechanisms like it) require more careful specification of the entities involved and the trust relationships between each other. In the cloud situation, the customer doesn't trust the cloud provider beyond just running his/her software (but inherently trusts him/herself). The cloud provider doesn't trust the customer to respect its isolation boundaries and must defend itself from SGX enclaves (and indeed all other client software) appropriately.
- haikuginger 8y agoThe trust dynamic is the opposite of what you think - SGX doesn't enable an enclave that protects the machine owner from the code they execute; it enables an enclave that protects executed code from the machine owner. The largest consumer application of this is DRM - modern UHD Blu-Ray playback on a PC requires a fully SGX-enabled backend; the negotiation to obtain playback keys and the decryption of the on-disc content is done in the SGX enclave.
- phkahler 8y agoIn that case the DRM code running in your PC is in a hostile environment. That is someone else's code running on my host and fearing me. The dynamic is exactly as I described. The question is: Whose code are you going to run on your machine? And why is there a trust issue? We've already seen the Sony rootkit fiasco, so it doesn't seem unfair to say one should not trust what DRM providers are doing. We should definitely not let their malicious garbage run in a secure onclave where you can't tell what it's doing as suggested by these researchers.
- throwaway2048 8y agoDon't forget DRM that the users don't want.