3 ms·
> While in the end the operator made the wrong decision, these automation ironies fit very well contribute to why he made those decisions or wasn't prepared to
by lmm 8y ago
> While in the end the operator made the wrong decision, these automation ironies fit very well contribute to why he made those decisions or wasn't prepared to make the right ones.
Not at all convinced. Hauling back on the stick and just keeping it there would never have been the right decision under any circumstances. At the same time it's a reasonably common panic reaction, and was long before any kind of cockpit automation.
A pilot who had been in tense situations before would have been more likely to make the right decision, sure, and modern automated systems may well mean that the first truly deadly situation occurs later in a pilot's career than it might otherwise. But by definition there's no safe way to test how a pilot will handle genuine danger.
- logifail 8y ago>> Hauling back on the stick and just keeping it there would never have been the right decision under any circumstances. From the BEA report [0]: "The horizontal bar then indicated a slight nose-up order compared with the aeroplane symbol." and "Nevertheless, the PF was also confronted with the stall warning, which conflicted with his impression of an overspeed. The transient activations of the warning after the autopilot disconnection may have caused the crew to doubt its credibility. Furthermore, the fact that the flight director was advising a nose-up attitude may have confirmed the PF’s belief that the stall warning was not relevant" (my highlight) [0] https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp09060...