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> this still doesn't support the thesis that it expands the problems associated with human operator In some circumstances it might. Look at Air France Flight

> this still doesn't support the thesis that it expands the problems associated with human operator In some circumstances it might. Look at Air France Flight 447 and the role of the co-pilot in stalling the aircraft. "Neither weather nor malfunction doomed AF447, nor a complex chain of error, but a simple but persistent mistake on the part of one of the pilots" [0] An aircraft like that has so many highly automated systems it is impossible for the human operators to fully understand them. [0] https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-ha...

lmm 8y ago
> An aircraft like that has so many highly automated systems it is impossible for the human operators to fully understand them. The aircraft was stalling because the pilot kept the flight stick pulled all the way back. Nothing automated or complex about it - a wood-and-canvas biplane would have had exactly the same problem.
- detaro 8y ago
  If I remember correctly: Due to sensor issues the plane dropped out of autopilot and switched into a different control mode ("Alternate law"). The pilot had to suddenly take over and had a wrong mental model of the state and configuration the plane was in, and likely didn't realize the consequences of the different control mode, among which is that it doesn't provide the same level of automated stall protection as the normal case. Since automation normally works, the pilot wasn't trained or experienced in flying in this mode. While in the end the operator made the wrong decision, these automation ironies fit very well contribute to why he made those decisions or wasn't prepared to make the right ones.
  - lmm 8y ago
    > While in the end the operator made the wrong decision, these automation ironies fit very well contribute to why he made those decisions or wasn't prepared to make the right ones. Not at all convinced. Hauling back on the stick and just keeping it there would never have been the right decision under any circumstances. At the same time it's a reasonably common panic reaction, and was long before any kind of cockpit automation. A pilot who had been in tense situations before would have been more likely to make the right decision, sure, and modern automated systems may well mean that the first truly deadly situation occurs later in a pilot's career than it might otherwise. But by definition there's no safe way to test how a pilot will handle genuine danger.
    - logifail 8y ago
      >> Hauling back on the stick and just keeping it there would never have been the right decision under any circumstances. From the BEA report [0]: "The horizontal bar then indicated a slight nose-up order compared with the aeroplane symbol." and "Nevertheless, the PF was also confronted with the stall warning, which conflicted with his impression of an overspeed. The transient activations of the warning after the autopilot disconnection may have caused the crew to doubt its credibility. Furthermore, the fact that the flight director was advising a nose-up attitude may have confirmed the PF’s belief that the stall warning was not relevant" (my highlight) [0] https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp09060...
renox 8y ago
I'm not sure what's your point: the human was in charge because the automated system failed. Yes, one pilot made an error which crashed the plane but IMHO the designers of the "airplane UI" are guilty too: one pilot is pushing, the other is pulling: why isn't there some big warning displayed? Both pilots are supposed to do the same action..

lmm 8y ago

> An aircraft like that has so many highly automated systems it is impossible for the human operators to fully understand them. The aircraft was stalling because the pilot kept the flight stick pulled all the way back. Nothing automated or complex about it - a wood-and-canvas biplane would have had exactly the same problem.

detaro 8y ago
If I remember correctly: Due to sensor issues the plane dropped out of autopilot and switched into a different control mode ("Alternate law"). The pilot had to suddenly take over and had a wrong mental model of the state and configuration the plane was in, and likely didn't realize the consequences of the different control mode, among which is that it doesn't provide the same level of automated stall protection as the normal case. Since automation normally works, the pilot wasn't trained or experienced in flying in this mode. While in the end the operator made the wrong decision, these automation ironies fit very well contribute to why he made those decisions or wasn't prepared to make the right ones.
- lmm 8y ago
  > While in the end the operator made the wrong decision, these automation ironies fit very well contribute to why he made those decisions or wasn't prepared to make the right ones. Not at all convinced. Hauling back on the stick and just keeping it there would never have been the right decision under any circumstances. At the same time it's a reasonably common panic reaction, and was long before any kind of cockpit automation. A pilot who had been in tense situations before would have been more likely to make the right decision, sure, and modern automated systems may well mean that the first truly deadly situation occurs later in a pilot's career than it might otherwise. But by definition there's no safe way to test how a pilot will handle genuine danger.
  - logifail 8y ago
    >> Hauling back on the stick and just keeping it there would never have been the right decision under any circumstances. From the BEA report [0]: "The horizontal bar then indicated a slight nose-up order compared with the aeroplane symbol." and "Nevertheless, the PF was also confronted with the stall warning, which conflicted with his impression of an overspeed. The transient activations of the warning after the autopilot disconnection may have caused the crew to doubt its credibility. Furthermore, the fact that the flight director was advising a nose-up attitude may have confirmed the PF’s belief that the stall warning was not relevant" (my highlight) [0] https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp09060...

renox 8y ago

I'm not sure what's your point: the human was in charge because the automated system failed. Yes, one pilot made an error which crashed the plane but IMHO the designers of the "airplane UI" are guilty too: one pilot is pushing, the other is pulling: why isn't there some big warning displayed? Both pilots are supposed to do the same action..