4 ms·
So it looks like the property that the Swiss system sacrifices is receipt freeness. In short, there is nothing to protect voters against someone coercing them t
by davidbanham 8y ago
So it looks like the property that the Swiss system sacrifices is receipt freeness. In short, there is nothing to protect voters against someone coercing them to reveal their vote.
In a first world country like Switzerland it's unlikely this coercion would take place with an AK47 at the ballot box. It is, however, conceivable that it could take place on the shop floor by either a boss or a trade union representative threatening to withhold work or pay.
I wouldn't be comfortable using a system like this for a state level election. The stakes are too high. That said, I do actually offer a product that sacrifices the same property and is designed to be used in elections for community organisations, companies, etc.
My digital election product:
https://scrut.in/ https://scrut.in/
More information on the concept of receipt freeness:
http://www.lsv.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/DKR-csfw06.pdf http://www.lsv.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/DKR-csfw06.pdf
- oneon 8y agoAs long as voters have to click votes in clear text on a screen, the security of the system is fundamentally screwed. As long as voters have to enter cryptic signs instead of clear text votes, the usability of the system is fundamentally screwed. So it's either fundamentally screwed or fundamentally screwed. Which one do you want? That's what the Swiss research on the topic basically boils down after 20 years of trials. Can we just stop it? Wanna help with the Initiative to stop e-voting in Switzerland? https://evoting-moratorium.wecollect.ch/ https://evoting-moratorium.wecollect.ch/ More info at https://e-voting-moratorium.ch/ https://e-voting-moratorium.ch/