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Important context from the executive summary that is missing from the headline: - the missing votes are from the Lt. Governors race only, not the total ballot
by burlesona 8y ago
Important context from the executive summary that is missing from the headline:
- the missing votes are from the Lt. Governors race only, not the total ballot
- many people reported software glitches with that specific ballot item
- the study blames faulty programming and insists the state not use electronic voting since it apparently is not reliable
Their conclusions are strongly worded but sound reasonable to me.
Quoted from the executive summary:
• Forensic examinations of the machine programming must be promptly undertaken to obtain answers, locate the source of the errors, and, if appropriate, hold officials accountable.
• Electronic voting systems must be immediately abandoned and paper ballots adopted so that no future elections are conducted on Georgia’s unauditable machines.
• Governor Kemp, Secretary Raffensperger, and legislative leaders must abandon their plan to adopt a new ballot-marking-device electronic voting system that, like the current system, is unauditable and vulnerable to problems of the type experienced in November’s election.
- tootie 8y agoI find it very hard to believe that paper ballots are actually more reliable. I'd imagine they're just much harder to detect errors so we can't assess how bad they are. Electronic ballots really shouldn't be a very difficult engineering challenge. We're already doing all of our financial transactions electronically and mistakes are relatively rare with an absolutely massive volume of transactions.
- burlesona 8y agoI agree with your sentiment, nevertheless every time I've used an electronic voting machine I've found it very clunky and difficult to operate. It's kind of amazing to me, it feels like the kind of thing that the hacker news crowd could solve in a long weekend. Of course it must be more complicated than that, but even the basic user interface always feels wrong. Just let me push a button that has the candidates name on it or directly above it. Oh well.
- greglindahl 8y agoAs a member of the "hacker news crowd", I think that paper ballots make a great solution to bad UI for an electronic voting machine. My county uses the paper ballot system described above.
- rebuilder 8y agoMaybe having the skillset to design a reasonably usable voting machine also means having an understanding of why electronic voting is problematic, and wanting to have nothing to do with them...
- specialist 8y agoYou think electronic voting could be preferable paper ballots? I checked and your county still offers touchscreen voting devices. Probably 1 per poll site, and at the early voting center, to comply with HAVA.
- greglindahl 8y agoI clearly said the opposite, but since you seem to be confused: I prefer paper ballots.
- specialist 8y agoI just wanted to be sure. A claim that the problem with electronic voting is bad UI could imply that fixing the UI would fix electronic voting.
- rsynnott 8y agoThere are two major problems with electronic voting. (a) It's often not implemented very well (either due to malice or incompetence; probably a bit of both in some cases). (b) When something goes wrong, and it will, there's often no reliable way to figure out what or to fix it. With sufficient effort, a 100% reliable paper count can be produced. Of course in many cases it may not get that effort, but it's possible, and this attribute is particularly important in an audit.
- tootie 8y agoWith sufficient effort a provably 100% reliable electronic system can be created.
- specialist 8y agoLet's wait until that system exists before we consider using it.
- cmurf 8y agoThere's reason to be suspicious of both systems, and insert the proper fraud and auditing measures for either system. It's not like election fraud didn't happen with paper ballots: ballot box stuffing and entire ballot boxes sunk into lakes. The thing is, mitigating this for a physical system like paper ballots, requires fairly basic training to become a poll monitor. Whereas the auditing of electronic systems is substantially more complicated, not least of which when for-profit companies compel the county/state into NDA's baring 3rd party audits, which happens to be the case in Georgia.
- Kephael 8y agoI would trust a voting system that spit out a hashed representation of my vote more than paper ballots. Paper ballots can be fabricated or misplaced. We witnessed people transporting votes in their personal vehicles in Broward county so there's no real chain of custody along with no verification of identity.
- specialist 8y agoHow would that hash prove your ballot was included in the final tally? If that story is true, that's a problem with Broward County, not with paper ballots.
- specialist 8y ago"We're already doing all of our financial transactions electronically and mistakes are relatively rare with an absolutely massive volume of transactions." Voting (election administration) is not double entry accounting. What you want would require every single person being required to cast a ballot and every ballot be counted. It'd also eliminate the possibility of the secret ballot. Are you sure that's what you want?
- burlesona 8y agoI'll add as a reply, since it's a side-tangent: When I moved to California I was really impressed by the way voting is handled here. Specifically two things: (1) I was able to vote one block away at a neighbors garage. I don't know exactly how this works, but apparently people can volunteer to host a polling place, go through a training program to get certified to do it, and then the state will give them the equipment to do it. These polling places are just about everywhere, and it made voting exceptionally quick and easy. The neighbors who ran it were also very courteous and professional. While there, I saw them handle several questions and problems that people had, and they did an excellent job. I was truly impressed. (2) The ballot system was: you mark a paper ballot with a pen, and then you feed that into a scanner which electronically tallies your vote. It also keeps the paper ballot around as a record. So it would seem to offer the practical efficiency of an electronic system with the auditability of a paper system. I liked it. Having previously voted in three other states, this was the best experience by far. I have my own complaints about California, but I'd love to see this way of handling elections become more widespread.
- SlowRobotAhead 8y agoSo, we know there are vulnerabilities in electronic voting machines, both sides are accusing the other of fraud, and now you are making an annecdote in favor of unsecured polling sites? I’m glad you had a good experience, but I’m very skeptical. Edit: it seems lots of people can disagree but no one can make an argument this is safer or more reliable in practice.
- burlesona 8y agoI would actually say that the decentralized and distributed nature of the polling places, combined with the well-designed voting machinery, gave me more confidence that orchestrating voter or electoral fraud would be profoundly difficult. From my experiences in other states, I would say it’s very possible to systematically lower voter turnout by making the process laborious, in part by having only a small number of polling places that you need to drive across town to access, and then by having long lines to vote (because so many people have to use the same polling place). Given a choice between the two I personally would favor the decentralized model.
- frankydp 8y agoI am unclear why ballot marking systems that are machine assisted paper systems would be unauditable or vulnerable. They make access easier(seniors), errors are correctable, reduce physical human errors(mismark/badmark), and provide a paper and electronic ballot trail.
- skookumchuck 8y agoI wonder how elections are audited when no identification of the voter is required and people are automatically registered to vote without evidence of citizenship.