3 ms·

Paper ballots disappear too though, don't they? What do you do when elections are expensive and you detect an error, and you can't find who cast the ballot?

greglindahl 8y ago
What problem are you trying to solve? It sounds like you want to make perfection the enemy of the good.
mikeash 8y ago
Disappearing a lot of paper ballots requires a lot of people working together and a lot of planning, making it more likely someone will talk and giving investigators a better chance of figuring out what went wrong. It also increases the odds of an incriminating paper trail being made of the activities. The fundamental difference between computer systems and paper systems is that the effort required to corrupt a computer system is mostly unrelated to the size of the corruption. Paper systems require a lot more effort for a large effect.
- threatofrain 8y ago
  Why do paper systems require more effort to hack? People just have to be able to predict where close elections are located and botch a few elections. The incentive to do so is everywhere. There have been so many close elections in modern memory. What do you do when you detect anomaly? Have an unpalatably expensive recount? That can be expensive enough to use as a reliable weapon. How do you know if the final count is complete? Do you track down every voter? These things sound expensive enough to simply not happen. Instead one side detects enough anomaly for a court to intervene, and the court considers blunt options or leaving the results as-is. For things like Bush v Gore the court is under enormous pressure to act quickly and perfectly, and they voted along party lines.
  - specialist 8y ago
    The gold standard for election integrity is the Australian ballot (private voting, public counting), where ballots are issued & cast at poll sites, and tabulated on site when the polls close. In my jurisdiction, trust is built on mutual distrust. Every receipt, seal, report, lock had to be handled and signed off by members of opposing parties. Sure, it's possible to corrupt poll site based elections. But you have to corrupt many sites. You'd also have to corrupt upstream and downstream actors as well. Super unlikely to go unnoticed.
macintux 8y ago
It is resource-intensive yet viable to track every paper ballot throughout the process. Digital ballots have no such guarantees. The best option to me seems to be scanned paper ballots, which offers the ability to perform analog recounts when there is suspicion of problems with the digital count. (Disclaimer: only a distant observer of this, there may be better options.)
- threatofrain 8y ago
  For context like 2018 congressional elections, or 2020 elections, what does it mean to track down paper ballots, such as to make sure the final count is complete? At least it sounds like de-anonymizing votes. Or does it mean it's so logistically unpalatable that you can bet on it not happening? Same thing with recount as a remedy to detected anamoly; it's theoretically possible. But is it so unpalatable that a gambler may gamble well on an event?
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
specialist 8y ago
I worked as a poll inspector. Typically, there are ballot accountability reports. eg 100 ballots printed for election day. 50 ballots issued, 49 ballots cast, 1 ballot spoiled, 50 unused ballots. 100 ballots returned to election HQ (central count). Adding or removing ballots from poll site based elections would be noticed. I can't speak to (all) other jurisdictions, so YMMV.

greglindahl 8y ago

What problem are you trying to solve? It sounds like you want to make perfection the enemy of the good.

mikeash 8y ago

Disappearing a lot of paper ballots requires a lot of people working together and a lot of planning, making it more likely someone will talk and giving investigators a better chance of figuring out what went wrong. It also increases the odds of an incriminating paper trail being made of the activities. The fundamental difference between computer systems and paper systems is that the effort required to corrupt a computer system is mostly unrelated to the size of the corruption. Paper systems require a lot more effort for a large effect.

threatofrain 8y ago
Why do paper systems require more effort to hack? People just have to be able to predict where close elections are located and botch a few elections. The incentive to do so is everywhere. There have been so many close elections in modern memory. What do you do when you detect anomaly? Have an unpalatably expensive recount? That can be expensive enough to use as a reliable weapon. How do you know if the final count is complete? Do you track down every voter? These things sound expensive enough to simply not happen. Instead one side detects enough anomaly for a court to intervene, and the court considers blunt options or leaving the results as-is. For things like Bush v Gore the court is under enormous pressure to act quickly and perfectly, and they voted along party lines.
- specialist 8y ago
  The gold standard for election integrity is the Australian ballot (private voting, public counting), where ballots are issued & cast at poll sites, and tabulated on site when the polls close. In my jurisdiction, trust is built on mutual distrust. Every receipt, seal, report, lock had to be handled and signed off by members of opposing parties. Sure, it's possible to corrupt poll site based elections. But you have to corrupt many sites. You'd also have to corrupt upstream and downstream actors as well. Super unlikely to go unnoticed.

macintux 8y ago

It is resource-intensive yet viable to track every paper ballot throughout the process. Digital ballots have no such guarantees. The best option to me seems to be scanned paper ballots, which offers the ability to perform analog recounts when there is suspicion of problems with the digital count. (Disclaimer: only a distant observer of this, there may be better options.)

threatofrain 8y ago
For context like 2018 congressional elections, or 2020 elections, what does it mean to track down paper ballots, such as to make sure the final count is complete? At least it sounds like de-anonymizing votes. Or does it mean it's so logistically unpalatable that you can bet on it not happening? Same thing with recount as a remedy to detected anamoly; it's theoretically possible. But is it so unpalatable that a gambler may gamble well on an event?
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]

specialist 8y ago

I worked as a poll inspector. Typically, there are ballot accountability reports. eg 100 ballots printed for election day. 50 ballots issued, 49 ballots cast, 1 ballot spoiled, 50 unused ballots. 100 ballots returned to election HQ (central count). Adding or removing ballots from poll site based elections would be noticed. I can't speak to (all) other jurisdictions, so YMMV.