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> it's debatable on whether or not those bombings did indeed cause the surrender of Japan They were specifically mentioned in emperor's address. Yes, they caus

> it's debatable on whether or not those bombings did indeed cause the surrender of Japan They were specifically mentioned in emperor's address. Yes, they caused the surrender. > Nagasaki and Hiroshima were not military targets They were military targets. There was army HQ, troops stationed there, factories which were producing military goods.

deleted 8y ago
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ceejayoz 8y ago
Citing the Emperor's address as evidence isn't a great idea. It contains plenty of demonstrably false statements, like this: > Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.
- gandhium 8y ago
  If you're cherry-pick anything, you will find plenty of demonstrably false statements anywhere.
avn2109 8y ago
>> "Yes, they caused the surrender." Broadly speaking, this is widely regarded amongst historians as not true at all, though most American schoolchildren are still taught it. Mostly this is because American conventional airpower was so overwhelming in Japan that its effects were substantially interchangeable with the bomb. Before the atomic bombings, Secretary of War Henry Stimson (who chose Hiroshima and Nagasaki as targets) mentioned that America had literally run out of targets to (conventionally) bomb in Japan [0]. A more detailed summary of the "Bomb didn't cause surrender" argument is given in [1]. [0] http://www.doug-long.com/stimson5.htm http://www.doug-long.com/stimson5.htm , ctrl-F for "I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon [the atomic bomb] would not have a fair background to show its strength." [1] https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-jap...
- iguy 8y ago
  "its effects were substantially interchangeable with the bomb" Yes, its military effects. (And humanitarian effects.) But no, in political effect. If "war is politics carried on by other means" and the goal was to defeat Japanese Fascism, then you had to make sure it couldn't come back from the dead after a grudging surrender. That was IMHO the main lesson of Versailles. And it worked.
  - skh 8y ago
    I think this is the part that people miss when discussing the nuclear attacks. It’s purpose was not tactical or military. It was a political purpose.
    - krapp 8y ago
      >. It’s purpose was not tactical or military. It was a political purpose. When people debate this issue, I find they tend to resort to a reductionist view of history and the players involved in order to justify their personal views of the US. The degree to which one is opposed to American cultural imperialism and military hegemony, or believes the US to be an evil state, tends to be the degree to which one believes the bombings had a nefarious purpose, or an ulterior motive. The whole thing has become a Rashomon style play of contradictory truths, except no one insisting on the order of events, motives or naming the culprit was actually there. It seems more likely to me than not that the bombings didn't have only that one explicit purpose to the exclusion of the others, just as it seems unlikely to me that the bombings were either absolutely responsible or absolutely irrelevant to Japan's surrender.
      - skh 8y ago
        Yes I agree with what you write here. I don’t mean to suggest it was a purely political calculation. I mean to suggest that decisions can be militarily bad or irrelevant while still be necessary politically.
- gandhium 8y ago
  This is widely regarded amongst _some revisionists_ as not true at all. About Stimson quote, you're saying: "America had literally run out of targets" while his quote states otherwise: "I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed" He's not stating that US _had_ run out of targets, he's only _fearing_ it. And your second link is a typical Stalin whitewashing with a lot of contradictions. He's stating that: 1. "Japan’s leaders had wanted to surrender anyway and likely would have done so before the American invasion planned for Nov. 1." - he directly contradicts that by later sentence "The destruction of Hiroshima had done nothing to reduce the preparedness of the troops dug in on the beaches of Japan’s home islands." 2. "Japan’s leaders had not seriously considered surrendering prior to that day. " - this directly condraticts #1. And Japan's leaders started considering surrender in 1945, including even emperor himself ("I was told that the iron from bomb fragments dropped by the enemy was being used to make shovels. This confirmed my opinion that we were no longer in a position to continue the war") 3. "What made them sit down to seriously discuss surrender for the first time after 14 years of war? It could not have been Nagasaki. The bombing of Nagasaki occurred in the late morning of Aug. 9, after the Supreme Council had already begun meeting to discuss surrender, and word of the bombing only reached Japan’s leaders in the early afternoon — after the meeting of the Supreme Council had been adjourned in deadlock and the full cabinet had been called to take up the discussion." He implies that the tipping point was a Soviet invasion. So for some reason bombing Nagasaki on August 9th wasn't able to convince Japan to surrender because of the timing, but Soviet invasion on August 9th somehow did. 4. "Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be in Japan proper in as little as 10 days. " - that's a very wishful estimation. Soviets didn't have enough transports and expertise to invade "Japan proper". And in reality after 10 days they didn't manage to invade even Kuril islands, not to mention their original target, Hokkaido.
gmueckl 8y ago
I was going to say that considering an entire city as a contiguous military target is a war crime. However, a quick search makes me doubt that such a provision was part of any relevant treaty in 1945. Massive bombings were inconveivable when the second Hague Convention was signed in 1907.

deleted 8y ago

[deleted]

ceejayoz 8y ago

Citing the Emperor's address as evidence isn't a great idea. It contains plenty of demonstrably false statements, like this: > Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

gandhium 8y ago
If you're cherry-pick anything, you will find plenty of demonstrably false statements anywhere.

avn2109 8y ago

>> "Yes, they caused the surrender." Broadly speaking, this is widely regarded amongst historians as not true at all, though most American schoolchildren are still taught it. Mostly this is because American conventional airpower was so overwhelming in Japan that its effects were substantially interchangeable with the bomb. Before the atomic bombings, Secretary of War Henry Stimson (who chose Hiroshima and Nagasaki as targets) mentioned that America had literally run out of targets to (conventionally) bomb in Japan [0]. A more detailed summary of the "Bomb didn't cause surrender" argument is given in [1]. [0] http://www.doug-long.com/stimson5.htm http://www.doug-long.com/stimson5.htm , ctrl-F for "I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon [the atomic bomb] would not have a fair background to show its strength." [1] https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-jap...

iguy 8y ago
"its effects were substantially interchangeable with the bomb" Yes, its military effects. (And humanitarian effects.) But no, in political effect. If "war is politics carried on by other means" and the goal was to defeat Japanese Fascism, then you had to make sure it couldn't come back from the dead after a grudging surrender. That was IMHO the main lesson of Versailles. And it worked.
- skh 8y ago
  I think this is the part that people miss when discussing the nuclear attacks. It’s purpose was not tactical or military. It was a political purpose.
  - krapp 8y ago
    >. It’s purpose was not tactical or military. It was a political purpose. When people debate this issue, I find they tend to resort to a reductionist view of history and the players involved in order to justify their personal views of the US. The degree to which one is opposed to American cultural imperialism and military hegemony, or believes the US to be an evil state, tends to be the degree to which one believes the bombings had a nefarious purpose, or an ulterior motive. The whole thing has become a Rashomon style play of contradictory truths, except no one insisting on the order of events, motives or naming the culprit was actually there. It seems more likely to me than not that the bombings didn't have only that one explicit purpose to the exclusion of the others, just as it seems unlikely to me that the bombings were either absolutely responsible or absolutely irrelevant to Japan's surrender.
    - skh 8y ago
      Yes I agree with what you write here. I don’t mean to suggest it was a purely political calculation. I mean to suggest that decisions can be militarily bad or irrelevant while still be necessary politically.
gandhium 8y ago
This is widely regarded amongst _some revisionists_ as not true at all. About Stimson quote, you're saying: "America had literally run out of targets" while his quote states otherwise: "I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed" He's not stating that US _had_ run out of targets, he's only _fearing_ it. And your second link is a typical Stalin whitewashing with a lot of contradictions. He's stating that: 1. "Japan’s leaders had wanted to surrender anyway and likely would have done so before the American invasion planned for Nov. 1." - he directly contradicts that by later sentence "The destruction of Hiroshima had done nothing to reduce the preparedness of the troops dug in on the beaches of Japan’s home islands." 2. "Japan’s leaders had not seriously considered surrendering prior to that day. " - this directly condraticts #1. And Japan's leaders started considering surrender in 1945, including even emperor himself ("I was told that the iron from bomb fragments dropped by the enemy was being used to make shovels. This confirmed my opinion that we were no longer in a position to continue the war") 3. "What made them sit down to seriously discuss surrender for the first time after 14 years of war? It could not have been Nagasaki. The bombing of Nagasaki occurred in the late morning of Aug. 9, after the Supreme Council had already begun meeting to discuss surrender, and word of the bombing only reached Japan’s leaders in the early afternoon — after the meeting of the Supreme Council had been adjourned in deadlock and the full cabinet had been called to take up the discussion." He implies that the tipping point was a Soviet invasion. So for some reason bombing Nagasaki on August 9th wasn't able to convince Japan to surrender because of the timing, but Soviet invasion on August 9th somehow did. 4. "Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be in Japan proper in as little as 10 days. " - that's a very wishful estimation. Soviets didn't have enough transports and expertise to invade "Japan proper". And in reality after 10 days they didn't manage to invade even Kuril islands, not to mention their original target, Hokkaido.

gmueckl 8y ago

I was going to say that considering an entire city as a contiguous military target is a war crime. However, a quick search makes me doubt that such a provision was part of any relevant treaty in 1945. Massive bombings were inconveivable when the second Hague Convention was signed in 1907.