The consensus among cryptographers for quite a while now has been that RSA should be avoided. Implementation vulnerabilities in RSA aren't surprising, and it's

The consensus among cryptographers for quite a while now has been that RSA should be avoided. Implementation vulnerabilities in RSA aren't surprising, and it's a poor choice of algorithm for modern cryptosystems. However, note that much of the problem with implementing RSA correctly is the padding. The specific recommendation here is to only use RSA OAEP, and preferably to abandon RSA altogether for more modern (elliptic curve) constructions. So no, they're not saying to deprecate RSA in its entirety (though I have high confidence all of the authors would strongly suggest that to anyone who asked). Rather, they're saying you should only use RSA with one very specific form of padding, if you absolutely insist on using RSA in 2019 (and you shouldn't unless you know you have to).