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Encryption usually solves three problems: 1. Authenticity of data; i.e. fixing DNS spoofing. 2. Privacy 3. Censorship Problem 1 is fixed today by DNSSEC. T
by teddyh 8y ago
Encryption usually solves three problems:
1. Authenticity of data; i.e. fixing DNS spoofing.
2. Privacy
3. Censorship
Problem 1 is fixed today by DNSSEC.
The best solution for problem 1, 2 and 3 would be if IPsec had a working and deployed PKI, so IPsec could be used for all IP-based traffic, and nobody had to worry about encryption on any layer above that.
Lacking that, the next best thing for problem 2 would be for DNS to use TLS and/or DTLS, and there is a standard for DNS over TLS (DoT), which makes perfect sense to use today between resolvers and authoritative servers, and between master servers and slave servers. However, this does not solve problem 3, since DoT uses a separate port and can be trivially downgraded by a MITM to use old non-TLS DNS. In theory, this could be fixed by something similar to how DANE solves the same problem for SMTP, in that a separate channel can be used to indicate not to allow protocol downgrades.
But, this problem of censorship is in practice, today, primarily an issue between the client and the resolver. If that traffic can use DNS-over-HTTPS, this would avoid problem 3 as well.
Note that none of this requires any centralization of resolvers, and is technically completely tangential. The problem of centralized resolvers existed since centralized resolvers first appeared; witness the prevalence of using Google’s 8.8.8.8, etc. This is a huge problem independent of DNS-over-HTTPS.
The connection, as far as I can tell, between DoH and centralization is that browsers want to fix as many as possible of problems 1-3, and using a centralized provider of DNS-over-HTTPS does that, at the expense of centralization and a single point of failure for problem 1-3. This is of course a terrible idea. But I can certainly see why browser vendors are attracted to the idea, bad though it may be.
- wahern 8y agoDoC doesn't actually address 2 or 3. I trust Sonic to not data mine or game my DNS queries much more than I trust Google or Cloudflare. I actually run my own recursive resolver locally, but if Firefox or Chrome default to DoC then the effect will be to lessen the privacy of Sonic Internet users, and users of similarly trustworthy ISPs. Worse, the techniques employed by browsers to select between a DoC resolver and a local resolver will inevitably on occasion break anonymizing VPN setups. When the browser becomes the OS, you lose interoperability with third-party software as browsers aren't built as platforms for local interfacing. And centralization makes censorship easier. A U.S. court may not be able to block resolution of a domain under co.uk, but it definitely can force Google or Cloudflare to block it. And it's much easier to execute an injunction against a small handful of service providers that reach 90% of users than trying to execute one to hundreds or thousands of smaller providers. Here's a recent injunction ordering Cloudflare to block a DNS name: https://torrentfreak.com/us-court-lists-dns-and-routing-services-in-broad-anti-piracy-order-181116/ https://torrentfreak.com/us-court-lists-dns-and-routing-serv...
- zzzcpan 8y agoYeah, centralization against censorship is oxymoron.
- teddyh 8y ago> DoC Surely you mean DoH? > I actually run my own recursive resolver locally As do I. > I trust Sonic to not data mine or game my DNS queries much more than I trust Google or Cloudflare. […] And centralization makes censorship easier. Oh, I agree. When you can't trust the single point of failure to not actually fail or not to be already fundamentally failed, then everything about centralization is bad.
- wahern 8y ago> > DoC > Surely you mean DoH? DNS over Cloud (DoC) is the term coined in the article to differentiate the underlying transport (DoT, DoH) from it's deployment (centralization).
- tptacek 8y agoDNSSEC doesn't really fix any of authentication today, for a number of reasons: 1. Almost no major domains are signed or have plans to sign (despite DNSSEC being one of the oldest "security" standard efforts at the IETF): https://twitter.com/tqbf/status/1086061495811743747 https://twitter.com/tqbf/status/1086061495811743747 2. Browsers have removed support for DNSSEC, and are not adding it back. 3. DNSSEC solves only the server-to-server authentication problem, but not the (much more common) client-server authentication problem that DoH solves. 4. And, of course, the authentication solution DNSSEC offers is effectively key-escrowed to world governments. There are other reasons as well, but that's a condensed version of the argument for why DoH is a live effort with gathering mainstream support, and DNSSEC is not.