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I attended the DoH talk by Daniel Stenberg at FOSDEM. When talking about alternatives he didn't mention Dan Bernstein's DNScurve ( https://dnscurve.org/ https:/
by Tepix 8y ago
I attended the DoH talk by Daniel Stenberg at FOSDEM. When talking about alternatives he didn't mention Dan Bernstein's DNScurve ( https://dnscurve.org/ https://dnscurve.org/ ).
It has low adoption and is not on a standards track (as far as I know) but I think it's the best proposal for DNS privacy and security so far.
- ForHackernews 8y agoDJB has a long history of producing outstanding software that almost nobody uses because of weird licensing, poor documentation or his prickly personality. He would do really well to get a PR agent or something, because technical excellence is rarely enough to succeed in a market.
- tptacek 8y agoDNSCurve is over; DoTLS and DoH provide essentially the same value in essentially the same deployment mode, but with mainstream support.
- dsl 8y agoDoH failed to keep the important part of DNS, which was statelessness. Running a stock or DNSCrypt resolver for 10k QPS requires a small to medium sized box that is within the technical realm of most people to operate. Adding stateful connection tracking now creates an operational burden that most IT folks would say "screw it, send it to the cloud." This centralizes the DNS in to the hands of a half dozen organizations that can operate at that scale, and they also happen to be the ones driving the policy forward.
- tptacek 8y agoI don't honestly know whether, if I had the choice, I'd take DoHT or DNSCurve. But that's not really my point. No matter how much I might like DNSCurve, it's not going to happen at this point: DoH will be the mainstream secure resolver going forward, because it's firewall-friendly and will have mainstream browser support. With DoH widely deployed, the argument for DNSCurve is cut back drastically. It's a very positive thing, to my mind; it's equally fatal, I think, to the arguments (such as they were) for DNSSEC --- which not only centralized DNS but also TLS security, and handed them to world governments. I also think: 1. No matter what the protocol, centralization of "off-net" DNS services inevitable, for reasons having little to do with performance. 2. People with concerns about Google and Cloud Flare (it me!) can easily run their own off-net resolvers, and people will inevitably start privacy-preserving DoH resolvers that are open to the public. 3. Over time, the performance implications of TLS for DNS lookups will become less and less a factor.