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Regardless of other problems, TFA makes it clear that LTJG Coppock failed really hard between 0120 and 0130. Although her subordinates probably should have dete
by jessaustin 8y ago
Regardless of other problems, TFA makes it clear that LTJG Coppock failed really hard between 0120 and 0130. Although her subordinates probably should have detected the Crystal sooner, she had ten minutes to save the lives of her crew, and she should have done so. Navigating out of danger might not have been possible, but an emergency stop like that executed by LTJG Breau a month earlier would have worked. The really unforgivable (as in, detail a firing squad) offense was not to sound the alarm and get those sailors out of their soon-to-flood bunks.
I'd say that the captain should receive the same punishment that Coppock gets, and the captain of a month before as well. It's difficult to say from the outside whether that should go up the chain, but perhaps it should, just to be safe.
- pdonis 8y ago> It's difficult to say from the outside whether that should go up the chain Based on one single incident, that's a fair comment. But it wasn't one single incident. There was one other collision, plus, as the article notes, a number of near misses that should have been critically analyzed but weren't. That's a pattern for which leaders up the chain are responsible.
- pdonis 8y ago> Although her subordinates probably should have detected the Crystal sooner One thing that jumped out at me was not having a lookout on both bridge wings. Yes, I know the ship was shorthanded, but that's the last place that should take a hit, particularly when navigating through a crowded shipping channel at night. Take someone from somewhere else.
- DuskStar 8y agoTo me it looked like a culture of taking the maximum that a person could be expected to do in one dimension, and expanding it to multiple dimensions. So, having one person watch both sides of the ship might be marginally possible - if they were only doing that. Similarly, teaching someone else while on watch might be marginally possible - if you only had one side of the ship to watch. Putting the two together though? Total failure.
- pdonis 8y ago> having one person watch both sides of the ship might be marginally possible - if they were only doing that I'm not sure even that is possible, at least not at night in a crowded shipping channel. A lookout under those circumstances should be focused on one field of view, not having to move around. > teaching someone else while on watch might be marginally possible - if you only had one side of the ship to watch As I understand it, the person doing the "teaching" was the Junior Officer of the Deck, not a lookout. The JOOD is supposed to be doing multiple things, not be focused on just watching. Her staying on the port side teaching too long was a contributing factor, yes, but only because of the prior decision to accept no lookout assigned to the starboard side to begin with. As for the culture that contributed to that decision, I'm not sure it was what you suggest as much as a simple failure to understand the impact of not having lookouts on both sides under those conditions. The fact that neither the captain nor the XO were even on the bridge during the transit is another indicator of that, IMO. The article says the captain was tired because of all the training that had been done that day and wasn't on the bridge because of that, but that just means more failure to understand the impact of tradeoffs: if push comes to shove, having more experienced supervision on the bridge during a challenging transit is more important than getting in some more training that day.
- a3n 8y ago> if push comes to shove, having more experienced supervision on the bridge during a challenging transit is more important than getting in some more training that day. Think of any bureaucracy. The training or lack is documented. Paperwork must be done, and the activities backing that paperwork must be done, because that's what gets measured, since the measurers can't be on board to watch. Sloppy procedures you might get away with, but lack of paperwork gets noticed immediately 100% of the time. And we all want to get promoted, officers especially in the military's "up or out" system. I read another article, probably here, about this same incident. One of the officers on duty in the CIC was doing her paperwork, in addition/instead of her function at the time. I'm certain this is the norm, because the bureaucracy will be served, and it always expands, never contracts. I would go so far to say that paperwork will increase even more, directly because of these specific incidents, "to make sure it never happens again." The incentives are pathologically perverse.
- danso 8y agoThe story notes that the ship's crew was overworked and overstretched due to the expedited schedule and crew cutbacks. On the night of the accident, there was only one person qualified to be a lookout, and was expected to watch both sides of the ship. The allocations of time and resources such that the USS Fitzgerald could never find time to make repairs or have adequately trained staff, at a time of increased patrolling to deal with North Korea, are factors that involve people higher up in the chain.
- a3n 8y ago> On the night of the accident, there was only one person qualified to be a lookout, That ship was therefore not fit for duty. Not that that would take a ship out of service, these days. They're probably all more or less unfit for duty, based on this and other articles about the same incidents. Former enlisted Navy, decades ago, made three Western Pacific deployments in and around the area of the article's concern. Not a subject matter expert, and probably never was.
- genkimind 8y agoNot sure about the firing squad... people make mistakes, I can certainly see how she was focused on trying to avoid a collision and forgot to sound the alarm. There must have been at least 5 other people on the bridge who could have done it as well. There were multiple failures that allowed the situation to get this out of hand. Ideally, she would have had forceful backup from the CIC. Of course it should go up the chain, it should go as high as the people making the tasking to the ship Captains when they know the ships aren't ready to execute. Blaming the crew in this situation is discounting the factors that force the crew to operate like this.
- shard972 8y ago> Not sure about the firing squad... people make mistakes, I can certainly see how she was focused on trying to avoid a collision and forgot to sound the alarm. There must have been at least 5 other people on the bridge who could have done it as well. But she was the CO no? Maybe im wrong but isn't it the CO's job to lead? Not just expect the grunts to step and be a leader?
- jessaustin 8y agoTechnically the CO was in bed at the time of the collision. OOD "had the conn" and certainly should not have wrecked the vessel. Still, we could imagine extenuating circumstances that would excuse an OOD's failure. No one ever imagined the CO's career would survive a collision like this.