3 ms·
Note that he was replying to a comment that was saying that a back door that is not wide open to criminals is comparable to thinking pi = 3. As is pointed out
by tzs 8y ago
Note that he was replying to a comment that was saying that a back door that is not wide open to criminals is comparable to thinking pi = 3.
As is pointed out in the Schneier article, the problems with a key escrow scheme are on the law enforcement side of things. They could lose access to their keys, especially if a lot of different agencies have keys.
Those are difficulties that can in theory be overcome, although it may not be practical to do so. That's a far cry from a pi = 3 issue.
- mattnewton 8y agoThe original argument was “The legislation in no way compromises the security of any Australians’ digital communications.” This is approaching a pi = 3 level falsehood because of the “in no way compromises” clause. There are many schemes that are outright illegal (in my not a lawyer interpretation of this law), and it nakedly makes the other schemes harder with state actors as additional points of failure.