4 ms·

But the million ways to go wrong IS the problem. I may be appealing to authority here, but is it disingenuous when an overwhelming majority of encryption and se

But the million ways to go wrong IS the problem. I may be appealing to authority here, but is it disingenuous when an overwhelming majority of encryption and security experts agree? https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/06/11/the-cybersecurity-202-we-surveyed-100-experts-a-majority-rejected-the-fbi-s-push-for-encryption-back-doors/5b1d39eb1b326b6391af094a/?utm_term=.cebc72f7c3b1 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cyb... https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/ray_ozzies_encr.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/ray_ozzies_en... https://www.justsecurity.org/53316/criminalize-security-criminals-secure/ https://www.justsecurity.org/53316/criminalize-security-crim...

tzs 8y ago
Note that he was replying to a comment that was saying that a back door that is not wide open to criminals is comparable to thinking pi = 3. As is pointed out in the Schneier article, the problems with a key escrow scheme are on the law enforcement side of things. They could lose access to their keys, especially if a lot of different agencies have keys. Those are difficulties that can in theory be overcome, although it may not be practical to do so. That's a far cry from a pi = 3 issue.
- mattnewton 8y ago
  The original argument was “The legislation in no way compromises the security of any Australians’ digital communications.” This is approaching a pi = 3 level falsehood because of the “in no way compromises” clause. There are many schemes that are outright illegal (in my not a lawyer interpretation of this law), and it nakedly makes the other schemes harder with state actors as additional points of failure.
msla 8y ago
Appealing to authority is only a bad argument if the authority is irrelevant to the topic. Appealing to Schneier on the topic of encryption is not an irrelevant appeal.

tzs 8y ago

Note that he was replying to a comment that was saying that a back door that is not wide open to criminals is comparable to thinking pi = 3. As is pointed out in the Schneier article, the problems with a key escrow scheme are on the law enforcement side of things. They could lose access to their keys, especially if a lot of different agencies have keys. Those are difficulties that can in theory be overcome, although it may not be practical to do so. That's a far cry from a pi = 3 issue.

mattnewton 8y ago
The original argument was “The legislation in no way compromises the security of any Australians’ digital communications.” This is approaching a pi = 3 level falsehood because of the “in no way compromises” clause. There are many schemes that are outright illegal (in my not a lawyer interpretation of this law), and it nakedly makes the other schemes harder with state actors as additional points of failure.

msla 8y ago

Appealing to authority is only a bad argument if the authority is irrelevant to the topic. Appealing to Schneier on the topic of encryption is not an irrelevant appeal.