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Yes, it definitely has the potential to become a major issue. So much so that the DoD is already working on tools to detect deepfakes [1]. Of course this will v

Yes, it definitely has the potential to become a major issue. So much so that the DoD is already working on tools to detect deepfakes [1]. Of course this will very likely devolve into an arms race akin to antivirus vendors vs malware developers. The fundamental problem is going to be that many people seem to actually like being in their comfortable echo chamber. So, if they're presented with a video that reaffirms their hunch that the Clintons run a child trafficking ring from under a pizza store, those people seem to be unlikely to venture out and do the necessary due diligence to verify the information they're being given :( [1]: https://medium.com/mit-technology-review/the-defense-department-has-produced-the-first-tools-for-catching-deepfakes-db03998f8b65 https://medium.com/mit-technology-review/the-defense-departm...

carry_bit 8y ago
> those people seem to be unlikely to venture out and do the necessary due diligence to verify the information they're being given Especially since people in those circles have for the last year been pushing the idea that the attention on deep fakes is preemptive cover for such a video rumored to be out there.
- mmjaa 8y ago
  And .. what if it is preemptive cover? What do we do about that circumstance? Like, seriously, this is shaping up to be a cyberwar nobody wants to admit. Either we can trust video sources from now on, or we can't - how is it going to be possible for TPTB to continue to divert public attention with video, if we can no longer trust our own eyes?
  - vokep 8y ago
    Hardware-based signing-while-recording, and only consider previously recorded self-verified unsigned recordings legitimate, otherwise unsigned=assumefake.
    - Bartweiss 8y ago
      > only consider previously recorded self-verified unsigned recordings legitimate, otherwise unsigned=assumefake Can you clarify this part, especially "self-verified unsigned"? I don't think I understand it - presumably you could generate camera-and-video-specific signatures which an edit couldn't reproduce, but it's not obvious to me how you would verify them without access to the original camera. As far as sign-while-recording, I agree. We'll quickly end up in a world where video of ongoing events is signed as it's taken. The simplest tactic I can think of is submitting a hash of the video file to some public store, which at least authenticates when it was shot. For an event with a well-known time (a speech, public protest, etc), that should suffice to prove the footage isn't faked, and corroboration of multiple videos should prove it's not an outright fabrication (e.g. pre-rendering a whole different speech). For time-nonspecific events like a video of a suspicious meeting, this wouldn't be enough. A hardware signature might prove that a video was real, but we'd still face a significant change in that unsourced videos floating around the web couldn't be treated as convincing. We're already getting there with photos, of course, but at the moment a clear, high-res video is pretty trustworthy without a source.

carry_bit 8y ago

> those people seem to be unlikely to venture out and do the necessary due diligence to verify the information they're being given Especially since people in those circles have for the last year been pushing the idea that the attention on deep fakes is preemptive cover for such a video rumored to be out there.

mmjaa 8y ago
And .. what if it is preemptive cover? What do we do about that circumstance? Like, seriously, this is shaping up to be a cyberwar nobody wants to admit. Either we can trust video sources from now on, or we can't - how is it going to be possible for TPTB to continue to divert public attention with video, if we can no longer trust our own eyes?
- vokep 8y ago
  Hardware-based signing-while-recording, and only consider previously recorded self-verified unsigned recordings legitimate, otherwise unsigned=assumefake.
  - Bartweiss 8y ago
    > only consider previously recorded self-verified unsigned recordings legitimate, otherwise unsigned=assumefake Can you clarify this part, especially "self-verified unsigned"? I don't think I understand it - presumably you could generate camera-and-video-specific signatures which an edit couldn't reproduce, but it's not obvious to me how you would verify them without access to the original camera. As far as sign-while-recording, I agree. We'll quickly end up in a world where video of ongoing events is signed as it's taken. The simplest tactic I can think of is submitting a hash of the video file to some public store, which at least authenticates when it was shot. For an event with a well-known time (a speech, public protest, etc), that should suffice to prove the footage isn't faked, and corroboration of multiple videos should prove it's not an outright fabrication (e.g. pre-rendering a whole different speech). For time-nonspecific events like a video of a suspicious meeting, this wouldn't be enough. A hardware signature might prove that a video was real, but we'd still face a significant change in that unsourced videos floating around the web couldn't be treated as convincing. We're already getting there with photos, of course, but at the moment a clear, high-res video is pretty trustworthy without a source.