6 ms·

That's not the question. I'm not asking why humans tend to do something. I'm asking why should one person's suffering or one person's life be intrinsically imp

That's not the question. I'm not asking why humans tend to do something. I'm asking why should one person's suffering or one person's life be intrinsically important to another---not why it often is. To get to the point another way. To decide how to act you need some kind of ethical system. Let's say you pick utilitarianism. Utilitarianism says that the suffering and happiness of each individual counts equally. The obvious question is: "Why is that so?" A possible answer is that, this is the premise that leads to the optimal outcome of maximum total happiness. Which leads to the next question: "Why is maximum total happiness the optimal outcome?" It's never ending. There is always another why question. Going deeper and deeper into that rabbit hole can be maddening and it's not always useful, but sometime it is. Ands it's almost always useful to ask a few whys. Without asking the whys, you have no justification for any of your beliefs, and thus no way of knowing which beliefs to hold on to.

zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y ago
> That's not the question. I'm not asking why humans tend to do something. I suspect that you are ... or you are indeed asking a nonsense question. But let's see ... > I'm asking why should one person's suffering or one person's life be intrinsically important to another---not why it often is. OK. I'm still not sure what exactly you mean by that question, though. > To get to the point another way. To decide how to act you need some kind of ethical system. Sure, that seems sensible to me. > Let's say you pick utilitarianism. OK. > Utilitarianism says that the suffering and happiness of each individual counts equally. I am not sure it necessarily does, but I guess that doesn't matter for the point that you are trying to make, so let's assume it does ... > The obvious question is: "Why is that so?" Which is a "how" question in disguise, isn't it? "How did it come that philosophers chose to define utilitarianism this way?" That certainly sounds like a very much empirical question to me!? > A possible answer is that, this is the premise that leads to the optimal outcome of maximum total happiness. That might well be a justification given by some philosopher, sure!? > Which leads to the next question: "Why is maximum total happiness the optimal outcome?" Which is another "how" question in disguise, isn't it? It's again asking for how it came to be that this was considered the optimal outcome, isn't it? > It's never ending. There is always another why question. Going deeper and deeper into that rabbit hole can be maddening and it's not always useful, but sometime it is. Ands it's almost always useful to ask a few whys. Well, if they are "how" questions in disguise, yeah, sure ... but you might as well directly ask the "how" questions in order to avoid the confusion? If you really don't mean a "how" question by those (be it exactly the ones I suggested above, or possibly slightly different ones), though, I don't really understand what your question is here either. > Without asking the whys, you have no justification for any of your beliefs, and thus no way of knowing which beliefs to hold on to. Well, yes, again, if you actually mean disguised "how" questions. I mean, just asking the question doesn't give you a justification, right? Rather, it's the first step towards potentially finding an answer, which then can serve as a justification. It's just that "why" questions that are not "how" questions in disguise don't have answers, which is why they are useless for the purpose, or if they have "answers", then that's only because the answer is assumed in the question, which obviously doesn't make for a good justification for anything. I am still curious though what exactly it is that you mean by "I'm asking why should one person's suffering or one person's life be intrinsically important to another"!
- learc83 8y ago
  Im asking to attempt to provide a justification for the commonly held belief that a person has intrinsic value. If you reject that belief and don't believe it is justifiable, why is that the case. Either way it doesn't really matter to my point. If you arbitrarily decide that all why questions are how questions, then you can't really ask a why question can you? >if they have "answers", then that's only because the answer is assumed in the question, Many ethical systems make the assumption that human happiness has intrinsic value--that it is an inherently good thing. They work backwards from that because what is "good" can't be discovered from observation and experimentation. >I am not sure it necessarily does It's definitely one of the basic tenets of Utilitarianism.
  - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y ago
    > Im asking to attempt to provide a justification for the commonly held belief that a person has intrinsic value. OK--and that's rather obviously a nonsensical question, because "intrinsic value" is a vacuous phrase. Value is by definition a subjective property assigned by a "valuer", while "intrinsic" is by definition a property that is independent of other entities. So, you are asking for a justification for the belief that a person has a value assigned to it by a valuer, absent any valuer. Obviously, such a thing doesn't exist due to logical self-contradiction, and thus no justification for it can exist either. > If you reject that belief and don't believe it is justifiable, why is that the case. Because it is a logical impossibility. > If you arbitrarily decide that all why questions are how questions, then you can't really ask a why question can you? I didn't do that? There are "genuine" "why" questions, they just are nonsensical (when not asking about a demonstrated conscious entity). "Why" has two distinct meanings, one of which is asking for an underlying mechanism, which maps to what I am calling "how" questions (because questions using "why" in that sense can be rephrased using "how"), the other is asking for an underlying intention, those are the "genuine" "why" questions. So, "Why does the sun rise in the east" is ambiguous. That question might be asking for the mechanism that makes the sun rise in the east, in which case it's a "how" question in disguise that is obviously one that can be examined empirically. Or it might be asking for the intention behind making the sun rise in the east--in which case it makes the unjustified assumption that there is some sort of consciousness behind it that had an intention when making the sun rise in the east, which is why it is a nonsensical question. Obviously, it is perfectly sensible to ask genuine "why" questions about entities that are known to have intentions, like "Why did you leave the light on?". > Many ethical systems make the assumption that human happiness has intrinsic value--that it is an inherently good thing. Arguably, they don't. Obviously, it's difficult to say anything specific about some unspecified ethical systems, but are you sure that you are not confusing the assumption that human happiness has value with the assumption that human happiness has intrinsic value? The assumption that human happiness has value seems common, the assumption that that value is intrinsic, not so much, very much to the contrary: It would seem rather obvious that that assumption is based on the valuation by the philosopher who is making the assumption. Really, it is questionable whether it is even an assumption, given that there is pretty overwhelming and ubiquitous evidence that humans almost universally value their own happiness. While that might not always be discussed explicitly, that often seems more like a technicality to me than like an actual lack of justification. > They work backwards from that because what is "good" can't be discovered from observation and experimentation. How else would it possibly be discovered? Or maybe I should ask first: What do you mean by "good"? > It's definitely one of the basic tenets of Utilitarianism. Well, I don't necessarily agree, but I also don't think it matters for this discussion, as it's probably a good enough approximation for the purpose. Also, if you are interested in a longer explanation of why the concept of "intrinsic value" doesn't make much sense, you might be interested in this video: https://youtu.be/2ASKV7Wg2jE https://youtu.be/2ASKV7Wg2jE

zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y ago

> That's not the question. I'm not asking why humans tend to do something. I suspect that you are ... or you are indeed asking a nonsense question. But let's see ... > I'm asking why should one person's suffering or one person's life be intrinsically important to another---not why it often is. OK. I'm still not sure what exactly you mean by that question, though. > To get to the point another way. To decide how to act you need some kind of ethical system. Sure, that seems sensible to me. > Let's say you pick utilitarianism. OK. > Utilitarianism says that the suffering and happiness of each individual counts equally. I am not sure it necessarily does, but I guess that doesn't matter for the point that you are trying to make, so let's assume it does ... > The obvious question is: "Why is that so?" Which is a "how" question in disguise, isn't it? "How did it come that philosophers chose to define utilitarianism this way?" That certainly sounds like a very much empirical question to me!? > A possible answer is that, this is the premise that leads to the optimal outcome of maximum total happiness. That might well be a justification given by some philosopher, sure!? > Which leads to the next question: "Why is maximum total happiness the optimal outcome?" Which is another "how" question in disguise, isn't it? It's again asking for how it came to be that this was considered the optimal outcome, isn't it? > It's never ending. There is always another why question. Going deeper and deeper into that rabbit hole can be maddening and it's not always useful, but sometime it is. Ands it's almost always useful to ask a few whys. Well, if they are "how" questions in disguise, yeah, sure ... but you might as well directly ask the "how" questions in order to avoid the confusion? If you really don't mean a "how" question by those (be it exactly the ones I suggested above, or possibly slightly different ones), though, I don't really understand what your question is here either. > Without asking the whys, you have no justification for any of your beliefs, and thus no way of knowing which beliefs to hold on to. Well, yes, again, if you actually mean disguised "how" questions. I mean, just asking the question doesn't give you a justification, right? Rather, it's the first step towards potentially finding an answer, which then can serve as a justification. It's just that "why" questions that are not "how" questions in disguise don't have answers, which is why they are useless for the purpose, or if they have "answers", then that's only because the answer is assumed in the question, which obviously doesn't make for a good justification for anything. I am still curious though what exactly it is that you mean by "I'm asking why should one person's suffering or one person's life be intrinsically important to another"!

learc83 8y ago
Im asking to attempt to provide a justification for the commonly held belief that a person has intrinsic value. If you reject that belief and don't believe it is justifiable, why is that the case. Either way it doesn't really matter to my point. If you arbitrarily decide that all why questions are how questions, then you can't really ask a why question can you? >if they have "answers", then that's only because the answer is assumed in the question, Many ethical systems make the assumption that human happiness has intrinsic value--that it is an inherently good thing. They work backwards from that because what is "good" can't be discovered from observation and experimentation. >I am not sure it necessarily does It's definitely one of the basic tenets of Utilitarianism.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y ago
  > Im asking to attempt to provide a justification for the commonly held belief that a person has intrinsic value. OK--and that's rather obviously a nonsensical question, because "intrinsic value" is a vacuous phrase. Value is by definition a subjective property assigned by a "valuer", while "intrinsic" is by definition a property that is independent of other entities. So, you are asking for a justification for the belief that a person has a value assigned to it by a valuer, absent any valuer. Obviously, such a thing doesn't exist due to logical self-contradiction, and thus no justification for it can exist either. > If you reject that belief and don't believe it is justifiable, why is that the case. Because it is a logical impossibility. > If you arbitrarily decide that all why questions are how questions, then you can't really ask a why question can you? I didn't do that? There are "genuine" "why" questions, they just are nonsensical (when not asking about a demonstrated conscious entity). "Why" has two distinct meanings, one of which is asking for an underlying mechanism, which maps to what I am calling "how" questions (because questions using "why" in that sense can be rephrased using "how"), the other is asking for an underlying intention, those are the "genuine" "why" questions. So, "Why does the sun rise in the east" is ambiguous. That question might be asking for the mechanism that makes the sun rise in the east, in which case it's a "how" question in disguise that is obviously one that can be examined empirically. Or it might be asking for the intention behind making the sun rise in the east--in which case it makes the unjustified assumption that there is some sort of consciousness behind it that had an intention when making the sun rise in the east, which is why it is a nonsensical question. Obviously, it is perfectly sensible to ask genuine "why" questions about entities that are known to have intentions, like "Why did you leave the light on?". > Many ethical systems make the assumption that human happiness has intrinsic value--that it is an inherently good thing. Arguably, they don't. Obviously, it's difficult to say anything specific about some unspecified ethical systems, but are you sure that you are not confusing the assumption that human happiness has value with the assumption that human happiness has intrinsic value? The assumption that human happiness has value seems common, the assumption that that value is intrinsic, not so much, very much to the contrary: It would seem rather obvious that that assumption is based on the valuation by the philosopher who is making the assumption. Really, it is questionable whether it is even an assumption, given that there is pretty overwhelming and ubiquitous evidence that humans almost universally value their own happiness. While that might not always be discussed explicitly, that often seems more like a technicality to me than like an actual lack of justification. > They work backwards from that because what is "good" can't be discovered from observation and experimentation. How else would it possibly be discovered? Or maybe I should ask first: What do you mean by "good"? > It's definitely one of the basic tenets of Utilitarianism. Well, I don't necessarily agree, but I also don't think it matters for this discussion, as it's probably a good enough approximation for the purpose. Also, if you are interested in a longer explanation of why the concept of "intrinsic value" doesn't make much sense, you might be interested in this video: https://youtu.be/2ASKV7Wg2jE https://youtu.be/2ASKV7Wg2jE