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That’s a deep straw man of what I said, to the point of being non-constructive mocking. You’re just being dishonest to claim I suggested trusting the spy agenci

That’s a deep straw man of what I said, to the point of being non-constructive mocking. You’re just being dishonest to claim I suggested trusting the spy agencies. Rather, I pointed out that they have a real mission, and they’re going to spend effort accomplishing it. But their mission isn’t to own every device — it’s to own a select few, probably on the order of hundreds or thousands a year. So, if we create a mechanism by which they can do that without owning every device, we can align our goal of protecting most devices with theirs of owning a few. This in turn increases security for nearly everyone, because powerful agencies no longer have the same motivation to cause harm — and might be persuaded to help. After all, it’s in their interest to prevent large remote compromises — just not a higher priority than maintaining their own access. Further, the best way to actually restrain them is through a change in government policy, which will only happen when the government believes there’s an alternative solution. Perhaps you could try responding to the point?

pjc50 8y ago
I think the underlying point is "which intelligence agencies would be allowed to compromise devices like this"?
- FakeComments 8y ago
  The ones courts which governed the relevant company were willing to issue warrants on behalf of — that is, those our regular legal and political systems decide on. For a big multinational like Apple, that’s probably a fair number. But it’s also harder to hide they’re doing that, and let’s us bring pressure on them politically for their political misdeeds. In the end, it’ll be major powers who can — US, Europe, China, etc. My point is that it’s never going to be the case that technologists get to unilaterally decide that for all of society. My proposal is just to bring phones into line with existing warrants: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19036408 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19036408 But by doing so, technologists have the political cover to push back on spy agency excesses and abuses.
  - pjc50 8y ago
    So you support China being able to hack any phone globally with a warrant in a Chinese court? Isn't that literally what Huawei are accused of facilitating?
    - FakeComments 8y ago
      No, I support China being able to spend an appreciable amount of time to crack each phone they have physical possession of, following a court order. I never suggested the ability for remote compromise (what Huawei is accused of), and my exact point is that we can create a cost to cracking each phone — in hashing power and time spent — if we compromise on the topic. No such cost exists now, because they achieve access via other means. The combination of requiring physical possession and appreciable hashing time per crack is a two-layered response to mass-surveillance. That’s the whole basis of the compromise I’m proposing: calling their bluff, and enabling warrant cracks as political cover to shut down mass surveillance and cracking as unnecessary.
      - pjc50 8y ago
        The "hashing time per crack" reminds me of the old 48-bit encryption which was mandated to have short, crackable keys. Or even the previous attempt at doing this with the "LEAF". Are you proposing some sort of work function within the crypto enclave? ie you leave the device brute-forcing for a few days and it spits out the key? The "appreciable time" is going to be subject to constant downward pressure, both politically and technologically. > political cover to shut down mass surveillance and compromise as unnecessary Mass surveillance is not going to go away without huge cultural reform of the security services. They don't take concessions.
        794CD01 8y ago
        >Mass surveillance is not going to go away without huge cultural reform of the security services. They don't take concessions. FakeComments was mostly talking about targeted surveillance, but I agree with him/her in spirit, since I believe that mass surveillance is not going to go away. Ever. So you can either yell futilely into the wind as it happens over your objections, up to, including, and perhaps going beyond a swarm of camera-bearing networked nanodrones coating the planet, or you can try to nudge it towards happening on slightly preferable terms.
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]
vageli 8y ago
> . But their mission isn’t to own every device — it’s to own a select few, probably on the order of hundreds or thousands a year. Things like Room 641A show that the government doesn't even need to engage the courts to collect data on millions of people and further, that they are not limiting their collection efforts to a few hundreds or thousands of devices a year.
techntoke 8y ago
My suggestion is to make phones secure by default, and if you need to track someone then use a network of cameras in public areas.
- dane-pgp 8y ago
  Better yet, scrap the network of cameras and employ a load of uniformed, unarmed police officers wearing body cams. (The cameras should default to deleting footage after a few hours, unless the officer presses a button to save it, and all arrests not recorded due to "missing" footage are deemed invalid). This helps communities to feel the reassurance of a trusted police presence, creates local jobs, and provides a decentralised alternative to having a single network controlled by a few hidden, unaccountable individuals. Putting a human conscience behind every single camera seems like a good way to prevent tyranny and encourage whistle-blowers.
- 794CD01 8y ago
  Yep, just shoulder surf the passcode the user enters on the train, or read their fingerprints/retinal patterns off their body and print it out onto your key material.
basilgohar 8y ago
> But their mission isn’t to own every device — it’s to own a select few, probably on the order of hundreds or thousands a year. This is patently untrue. Snowden and much more have made it absolutely, unambiguously clear that national spy agencies do wish to gather and collect absolutely and every bit of information possible about their own law-abiding citizens as well as those here that are not.
- FakeComments 8y ago
  Could you cite anything supporting that? I followed the Snowden leaks quite closely, but don’t remember anything close to unambiguously showing that.
  - basilgohar 8y ago
    Please review the following with explicit citations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosure...
    - FakeComments 8y ago
      That’s a non-responsive answer, and you know it.
      - Forbo 8y ago
        The PRISM program alone shows the NSA's intent to collect as much information as possible. This in conjunction with the Utah Data Center makes it pretty aparrent what the goal was.

pjc50 8y ago

I think the underlying point is "which intelligence agencies would be allowed to compromise devices like this"?

FakeComments 8y ago
The ones courts which governed the relevant company were willing to issue warrants on behalf of — that is, those our regular legal and political systems decide on. For a big multinational like Apple, that’s probably a fair number. But it’s also harder to hide they’re doing that, and let’s us bring pressure on them politically for their political misdeeds. In the end, it’ll be major powers who can — US, Europe, China, etc. My point is that it’s never going to be the case that technologists get to unilaterally decide that for all of society. My proposal is just to bring phones into line with existing warrants: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19036408 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19036408 But by doing so, technologists have the political cover to push back on spy agency excesses and abuses.
- pjc50 8y ago
  So you support China being able to hack any phone globally with a warrant in a Chinese court? Isn't that literally what Huawei are accused of facilitating?
  - FakeComments 8y ago
    No, I support China being able to spend an appreciable amount of time to crack each phone they have physical possession of, following a court order. I never suggested the ability for remote compromise (what Huawei is accused of), and my exact point is that we can create a cost to cracking each phone — in hashing power and time spent — if we compromise on the topic. No such cost exists now, because they achieve access via other means. The combination of requiring physical possession and appreciable hashing time per crack is a two-layered response to mass-surveillance. That’s the whole basis of the compromise I’m proposing: calling their bluff, and enabling warrant cracks as political cover to shut down mass surveillance and cracking as unnecessary.
    - pjc50 8y ago
      The "hashing time per crack" reminds me of the old 48-bit encryption which was mandated to have short, crackable keys. Or even the previous attempt at doing this with the "LEAF". Are you proposing some sort of work function within the crypto enclave? ie you leave the device brute-forcing for a few days and it spits out the key? The "appreciable time" is going to be subject to constant downward pressure, both politically and technologically. > political cover to shut down mass surveillance and compromise as unnecessary Mass surveillance is not going to go away without huge cultural reform of the security services. They don't take concessions.
      - 794CD01 8y ago
        >Mass surveillance is not going to go away without huge cultural reform of the security services. They don't take concessions. FakeComments was mostly talking about targeted surveillance, but I agree with him/her in spirit, since I believe that mass surveillance is not going to go away. Ever. So you can either yell futilely into the wind as it happens over your objections, up to, including, and perhaps going beyond a swarm of camera-bearing networked nanodrones coating the planet, or you can try to nudge it towards happening on slightly preferable terms.

deleted 8y ago

[deleted]

vageli 8y ago

> . But their mission isn’t to own every device — it’s to own a select few, probably on the order of hundreds or thousands a year. Things like Room 641A show that the government doesn't even need to engage the courts to collect data on millions of people and further, that they are not limiting their collection efforts to a few hundreds or thousands of devices a year.

techntoke 8y ago

My suggestion is to make phones secure by default, and if you need to track someone then use a network of cameras in public areas.

dane-pgp 8y ago
Better yet, scrap the network of cameras and employ a load of uniformed, unarmed police officers wearing body cams. (The cameras should default to deleting footage after a few hours, unless the officer presses a button to save it, and all arrests not recorded due to "missing" footage are deemed invalid). This helps communities to feel the reassurance of a trusted police presence, creates local jobs, and provides a decentralised alternative to having a single network controlled by a few hidden, unaccountable individuals. Putting a human conscience behind every single camera seems like a good way to prevent tyranny and encourage whistle-blowers.
794CD01 8y ago
Yep, just shoulder surf the passcode the user enters on the train, or read their fingerprints/retinal patterns off their body and print it out onto your key material.

basilgohar 8y ago

> But their mission isn’t to own every device — it’s to own a select few, probably on the order of hundreds or thousands a year. This is patently untrue. Snowden and much more have made it absolutely, unambiguously clear that national spy agencies do wish to gather and collect absolutely and every bit of information possible about their own law-abiding citizens as well as those here that are not.

FakeComments 8y ago
Could you cite anything supporting that? I followed the Snowden leaks quite closely, but don’t remember anything close to unambiguously showing that.
- basilgohar 8y ago
  Please review the following with explicit citations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosure...
  - FakeComments 8y ago
    That’s a non-responsive answer, and you know it.
    - Forbo 8y ago
      The PRISM program alone shows the NSA's intent to collect as much information as possible. This in conjunction with the Utah Data Center makes it pretty aparrent what the goal was.