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> what the false positive rate was My understanding is that it was basically zero: there was no instance where technical experts raised a concern of this magni
by pdonis 8y ago
> what the false positive rate was
My understanding is that it was basically zero: there was no instance where technical experts raised a concern of this magnitude (remember that Boisjoly explicitly said in a memo the previous July that there was a risk of loss of the spacecraft and loss of life) that was not valid.
> Where the NASA administrators bombarded with such concerns for every launch, or were reports a relatively rare occurrence?
Critical flight risks were reviewed before every launch, but the number of them at any given time was small: AFAIK the SRB O-ring issue was the only critical flight risk before the Challenger launch.
Another crucial piece of back story that isn't often mentioned: Boisjoly and the other engineers at Thiokol had already tried, the previous summer (after the July memo that Boisjoly wrote) to get all shuttle flights stopped until the SRB issue could be understood and fixed. NASA refused. So when they were trying to convince NASA not to launch the Challenger, the night before the flight, they were already handicapped because of that previous response by NASA.
- WalterBright 8y agoI thought that the first manned Saturn launch was enormously risky because the engines were unreliable. NASA gambled and won, but it could have gone the other way easily.
- russdill 8y agoThey had pogo oscillations that could cause the engine to shut down. There were abort procedures for thrust failures.
- WalterBright 8y agoI doubt anyone wanted to try out the abort procedures with their own bodies atop a tank of burning rocket fuel shaking itself to pieces :-)
- pdonis 8y agoIt doesn't seem like anyone was enthusiastic about trying them even for practice. According to the Wikipedia page on space shuttle abort modes (linked to from the apollo abort modes page), NASA considered making the first flight of Columbia a practice RTLS abort; but the mission commander, John Young, declined, saying "let's not practice Russian roulette".
- WalterBright 8y agoRight, if you're taking a big risk of death, have it be for the payoff of a useful mission. Not a practice flight where the payoff is simply that you didn't die.
- Maakuth 8y agoHere's a Wikipedia article about the abort modes. It probably would get pretty tense if you had to abort when the rocket started going through 'rapid unplanned disassembly', though. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_abort_modes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_abort_modes
- lloeki 8y ago> rapid unplanned disassembly Is that proper aerospace lingo, like "controlled flight into terrain"? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controlled_flight_into_terrain https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controlled_flight_into_terrain
- SomeHacker44 8y agoAs a pilot, CFiT is very descriptive. RUD sounds to my (layman’s) ear to be a nice way of saying “uncontrolled unplanned self destruction.” I could call an incident where a plane engine (on my plane) threatened to tear itself and the wing to bits because combustion became unbalanced, causing a vibration that had I not shut it down would have led to a rapid unplanned disassembly too, and likely not ended as well as the preventative.
- TeMPOraL 8y agoYes. It roughly translates to "exploded, though we didn't want that". There's an equivalent term fof CFiT too - lithobraking. It's like aerobraking (using planet's atmosphere to shed some speed), except with rocks.
- tragomaskhalos 8y agoSimilar protocols for the Shuttle of course; was in Gambia in 1990 and got chatting with some NASA folks just sitting round the pool at a nearby hotel - they told us they were there as there was a specific abort phase whereby the Shuttle would glide across the Atlantic and land at Banjul airport (whose runway NASA had paid to have extended for this purpose!); in that unlikely eventuality they would have to leap into action, otherwise it was a nice few days in the sun for them.
- pdonis 8y agoYes, they were risky, but the risks were understood (and the technical people certainly were not giving any inaccurate information to managers about them). Not the same situation as the shuttle SRB O-rings, where at the time of the Challenger launch nobody understood exactly what was causing the failures; the engineers had suspicions but no definite knowledge (and their efforts to get NASA and their managers to give them more data to help them better understand the failures had been mostly unsuccessful).
- WalterBright 8y ago> nobody understood exactly what was causing the failures Nobody understood exactly at the time what was causing the F1 engine instability. They were reduced to trying random things and hoping it worked. The mathematical models to figure it out were not developed until years later. The schedule was rushed out of fear the Soviets would beat them. Don't mistake the success of the gamble as the same as the risk was low and understood. NASA gambled big time, and they were very lucky. I'm not saying they were wrong to take the gamble, either. But they knew the engines might blow up and launched anyway.
- pdonis 8y ago> Nobody understood exactly at the time what was causing the F1 engine instability. Hm, interesting, I didn't realize the state of knowledge was that limited at the time. > Don't mistake the success of the gamble as the same as the risk was low and understood. I didn't mean to imply that the risk was low. You're right that it wasn't (and you've clarified that it wasn't well understood either). It still seems like a different decision process from the one that led to the Challenger explosion, though. In the Saturn V case, it seems like NASA made an open-eyed decision to gamble with everyone involved being aware of the risk and on board with it. In the Challenger case, NASA basically refused to properly evaluate the risk in the first place.