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> You know, they can see the metadata. When's the last time we had problems with metadata? The POTS network? Yep. Yes, metadata is a problem, particularly with
by feanaro 8y ago
> You know, they can see the metadata. When's the last time we had problems with metadata? The POTS network? Yep.
Yes, metadata is a problem, particularly with calls. However, Signal recently added the sealed sender (https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/ https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) feature which makes the server blind to who the sender of a message is.
> And you're indeed right the client has reproducible builds. But the server side certainly doesn't.
That's true, but the server side is much less important when it comes to cryptographic assurances.
Signal is definitely not a panacea, but by many counts it's better than anything else that currently exists and has any semblance to something a typical user can use.
- Forbo 8y agoFor what it's worth, they don't retain any of that metadata. This has been tested in court: > We’ve designed the Signal service to minimize the data we retain about Signal users, so the only information we can produce in response to a request like this is the date and time a user registered with Signal and the last date of a user’s connectivity to the Signal service. https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ This was even before sealed sender, so if anything my confidence in the Signal Foundation has only increased.