3 ms·

It probably comes down to a question of specifying whether the treat model includes an adversary who can coerce both parties and check that their plaintexts agr

It probably comes down to a question of specifying whether the treat model includes an adversary who can coerce both parties and check that their plaintexts agree. Otherwise, I wouldn't see any need for a shared secret key because the ciphertext can be encrypted by any method at all. The onetime pad is used only by the person under coercion and only for the purpose of misleading the adversary.

theoh 8y ago
Yeah, they've got that covered too. The second paragraph of the paper says that they're working with the notion of "deniable encryption" introduced in a paper by Canetti et al: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/deniable.pdf http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/deniable.pdf Here's the abstract of the Canetti paper: "Consider a situation in which the transmission of encrypted messages is intercepted by an adversary who can later ask the sender to reveal the random choices (and also the secret key, if one exists) used in generating the ciphertext, thereby exposing the cleartext. An encryption scheme is deniable if the sender can generate ‘fake random choices’ that will make the ciphertext ‘look like’ an encryption of a different cleartext, thus keeping the real cleartext private. Analogous requirements can be formulated with respect to attacking the receiver and with respect to attacking both parties. Deniable encryption has several applications: It can be incorporated in current protocols for incoercible (“receipt-free”) voting, in a way that eliminates the need for physically secure communication channels. It also underlies recent protocols for general incoercible multiparty computation (with no physical security assumptions). Deniable encryption also provides a simplified and elegant construction of an adaptively secure multiparty protocol. In this paper we introduce and define deniable encryption and propose constructions of such schemes. Our constructions, while demonstrating that deniability is obtainable in principle, achieve only a limited level of it. Whether they can be improved is an interesting open problem." I'm not sure how the paper under discussion relates to those applications, if at all. I'm not sure I buy the argument you appear to be making that a single principal can use a fake OTP to achieve deniability with any encryption scheme, but that this breaks down when both sender and receiver are coerced. If the fake plaintexts don't match it comes down to one person's word against another. The consequences of that scenario are outside the scope of "deniable encryption". It sounds a bit like a prisoner's dilemma situation. But the key defining feature of "deniable encryption" is of deniability within a specified encryption scheme.

theoh 8y ago

Yeah, they've got that covered too. The second paragraph of the paper says that they're working with the notion of "deniable encryption" introduced in a paper by Canetti et al: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/deniable.pdf http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/deniable.pdf Here's the abstract of the Canetti paper: "Consider a situation in which the transmission of encrypted messages is intercepted by an adversary who can later ask the sender to reveal the random choices (and also the secret key, if one exists) used in generating the ciphertext, thereby exposing the cleartext. An encryption scheme is deniable if the sender can generate ‘fake random choices’ that will make the ciphertext ‘look like’ an encryption of a different cleartext, thus keeping the real cleartext private. Analogous requirements can be formulated with respect to attacking the receiver and with respect to attacking both parties. Deniable encryption has several applications: It can be incorporated in current protocols for incoercible (“receipt-free”) voting, in a way that eliminates the need for physically secure communication channels. It also underlies recent protocols for general incoercible multiparty computation (with no physical security assumptions). Deniable encryption also provides a simplified and elegant construction of an adaptively secure multiparty protocol. In this paper we introduce and define deniable encryption and propose constructions of such schemes. Our constructions, while demonstrating that deniability is obtainable in principle, achieve only a limited level of it. Whether they can be improved is an interesting open problem." I'm not sure how the paper under discussion relates to those applications, if at all. I'm not sure I buy the argument you appear to be making that a single principal can use a fake OTP to achieve deniability with any encryption scheme, but that this breaks down when both sender and receiver are coerced. If the fake plaintexts don't match it comes down to one person's word against another. The consequences of that scenario are outside the scope of "deniable encryption". It sounds a bit like a prisoner's dilemma situation. But the key defining feature of "deniable encryption" is of deniability within a specified encryption scheme.