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> deniable encryption [Canetti et al., Crypto’96] provides the additional guarantee that the plaintext remains secret even in face of authoritative entities tha
by est31 8y ago
> deniable encryption [Canetti et al., Crypto’96] provides the additional guarantee that the plaintext remains secret even in face of authoritative entities that attempt to coerce (or bribe) communicating parties to expose their internal states, including the plaintexts, keys and randomness. To achieve this guarantee, deniable encryption is equipped with a faking algorithm which allows parties to generate fake keys and randomness that make the ciphertext appear consistent with any plaintext of the parties’ choice.
Does the faking algorithm for the scheme proposed in the paper require any of the private information as input? In other words: given a ciphertext only, can I come up with keys and randomness to provide an arbitrary plaintext?
OTP for example does have this property, I can just simply XOR the plaintext I want to have with the ciphertext and claim that this is the key.
Edit: this question is relevant as if the private information is needed, it might limit your options once you do give them fake stuff. If some party can prove that the fake plaintext/key pair you gave them is indeed fake, then you should be able to walk back on your claims and say that you never had the plaintext or forgot the password or whatever.
- theoh 8y agoThe idea of "bideniability" is defined early in the paper as meaning that there is no way for an adversary to distinguish between real and fake (key, randomness, message) sets, even when they receive one of those from both the sender and the receiver. So, by that definition, no plaintext can be proven to be fake in a bideniable system. It doesn't matter whether sender and receiver both lie, or whether only one of them does. I haven't read far enough to be able to answer the first part of your question (does faking require access to the real ciphertext) but based on the symmetry of the definition of bideniability, that would be surprising.
- est31 8y agoSo I've had a little look at the paper and the first part of my question is addressed by their term "public deniability". Apparently they have public denyability for the receiver side, but not the sender side. So everyone can claim that they were the recipient of the message with X being its content, but only someone who knows the sender secrets can claim authorship.