> If a government messaging standard is introduced, it will absolutely be designed to consider lawful intercepts like US CALEA. Happened exactly like that when

> If a government messaging standard is introduced, it will absolutely be designed to consider lawful intercepts like US CALEA. Happened exactly like that when Germany introduced their "official version" of e-mail, called "De-Mail". When the Chaos Computer Club pointed out how their whole system is insecure, due to, amongst other issues, a lack of end-to-end encryption. The German government simply decided to declare the whole thing as "secure" trough legal definitions [0]. Which means that in practice the system is not secure, but the law considers it secure because it fulfills the arbitrary, political, definitions for "secure transmission", which also includes the capabilities for lawful interception. [0] http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/de-mail-bundestag-erklaert-bundes-mail-per-gesetz-als-sicher-a-895361.html http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/de-mail-bundestag...