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Genode OS: A tool kit for highly secure special-purpose operating systems
- AnaniasAnanas 8y agoAn obligatory mention when we talk about secure operating systems is the seL4 microkernel (https://github.com/seL4/seL4 https://github.com/seL4/seL4) where they have formally verified every line of code using the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL.
- doener 8y agoYes, I read about it in the German Wikipedia (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/L4_(Mikrokernel) https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/L4_(Mikrokernel)), but the link provided there as a source does not work anymore: http://ertos.nicta.com.au/research/l4.verified http://ertos.nicta.com.au/research/l4.verified The other link provided is a press release in German: http://pressetext.de/news/090817022/sicherheits-beweis-fuer-betriebssystem-kernel/ http://pressetext.de/news/090817022/sicherheits-beweis-fuer-...
- martin1975 8y agoAlways made me curious why Google didn't decide to use seL4 as a base for Fuchsia and instead went with Zircon...
- casual_slacker 8y agoThere might be license issues between AGPLv3 of GenodeOS and the Apache 2.0 or GPLv2 that Android components use.
- renox 8y ago? I know that this is a GenodeOS topic, but the GP wondered about seL4 which has some parts in GPLv2 and other BSD (2-clause). IMHO the reason that few use seL4 is that it isn't ready: AFAIK seL4 isn't able to use efficiently multiple core with power savings, which is mandatory for usage in phones (and phones can use complex CPU with big and little cores).
- petecox 8y agosynergy - Android's bootloader (fastboot mode, etc) uses LK, of which Zircon is a fork.
- jcelerier 8y ago> where they have formally verified every line of code using the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. and it's interesting to note that even then, they still had a few bugs here and there due to incomplete / wrong formalisation
- Koshkin 8y agoAlso, I imagine, automatic theorem provers, too, can have bugs.
- nickpsecurity 8y agoYes. That's the reason the formal methodists started building verified or checkable tools with the checkers being tiny. Doing an solver might involve making it produce a log of each step it made with a simpler system checking them. The checking is also easy to parallelize with linear scaling. My current recommendation is checkable solvers done in a parallel language like Chapel with tiny, verified checkers. Run it logless first to see if it even passes at all. Once passes, run it in logging mode to get evidence to feed to checker. Use multiple, sequential processes to check that as concurrency in checker reduces confidence.
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- im_down_w_otp 8y agoThe fine people on the Genode project did yeoman's work for constructing something sufficiently complex atop seL4. Without their exploring, mailing-list cajoling, implementation, and write-ups our seL4 work would be significantly more painful, and it's already unpleasantly painful as-is.
- Timothycquinn 8y agoI was wondering what the fit with Qubes OS was. Found this entry on Genode challenges page: "Genode as virtualization layer for Qubes OS - ...This exploration project pursues the goal of replacing Xen by Genode as virtualization layer for Qubes."
- DyslexicAtheist 8y ago> I was wondering what the fit with Qubes OS was. Rootkovska has been (imvho rightfully) criticized in the past for selling isolation but dismissing the attack surface in Xen. I think Genode can help here: https://twitter.com/rootkovska/status/949297922998489088 https://twitter.com/rootkovska/status/949297922998489088 Though I believe thegrugq / ioerror have a point when they say that hardware compartmentalization is superior than layers of SW virtualization: https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/515085244198703105 https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/515085244198703105 The threat model is relevant though: In that aspect QubesOS has some problem finding an audience. I personally like it (I'm an active user) ... but mostly because I have a fetish for privacy+security and I like to play with new stuff. However if you push a journalist or activist or anyone facing real risk to learn QubesOS (the learning curve is huge for the general user), it makes more sense to just invest in HW based compartmentalization instead. HW compartmentalization can easier be trained and there is less likely a chance of shooting yourself in the foot. It's not a tech that anybody whose life is under threat should be using. First rule here not to use tech in the first place, and for cases where the risk is marginal use HW based isolation ... then there is nothing for a long time followed by things like QubesOS, Signal etc. These things are just good enough to hide an affair but it's reckless selling them as serious solution to tech-illiterate folk who have something to loose.
- yellowapple 8y agoSaid attack surface is exactly why OpenBSD was so hesitant to buy into the virtualization trend up until they rolled their own hypervisor.
- heavenlyhash 8y agoI think the linked Rootkovska tweet (or more specifically, her own thread/replies to it) actually gracefully acknowledges that Xen is not magically free of attack surfaces. She's also written some fairly long-form articles about Xen security and the (sometimes significant) room for improvement, including, for example, this Black Hat talk (from 2008!) about breaking Xen: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/bh08/part3.pdf https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/bh08/part3.pdf I don't disagree with the rest of your comment :) I just have the impression that any discussion about Qubes+Xen is less "dismissal" and more that supporting a variety of hypervisors is "a small matter of programming" (where "small" is used to mean "absolutely not small").
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- mewmew 8y agoI've been following the Genode project for quite some time, and first got the chance to meet the Genode team when they presented their work at FOSDEM in 2012. I've since been amazed, both at the pace of development they've kept up while keeping to their principles of a small trusted code base that is kept clean by refactoring when common concepts are outlined. My friend Daniel and I were invited to join their Hack n' Hike event a few years back, and it was just the loveliest! We hiked together during the days, sharing a barbecue around the camp fire in the evenings and hacking together at night. The people on the Genode team are among the friendliest I've come across in the open source community. I wish you all the best of futures, both with the Genode project and in life in general. Cheerful regards, Robin Edit: the slides from FOSDEM 2012 introducing Genode (in the state of the project back then): https://genode-labs.com/publications/nfeske-genode-fosdem-2012-02.pdf https://genode-labs.com/publications/nfeske-genode-fosdem-20...
- akavel 8y agoIt's worth to note they now have a downloadable USB image, which is notably dogfed (dogfooded? dogfeeded?) by the Genode developers: https://genode.org/download/sculpt https://genode.org/download/sculpt And some eye candy: https://genode.org/about/screenshots https://genode.org/about/screenshots
- deno 8y agoIt’s a verb (to dogfood) so it would be dogfooded. More intuitive if you use it in continuous tense: “I am/have been dogfooding Foobar on my dog.” Also they really need to put a README on that live CD.
- jccalhoun 8y agoDistrowatch did a review of it (which I would bet inspired someone to submit genode to hackernews) https://distrowatch.com/weekly.php?issue=20190121#sculpt https://distrowatch.com/weekly.php?issue=20190121#sculpt
- lsofzz 8y ago> It's worth to note they now have a downloadable USB image, which is notably dogfed (dogfooded? dogfeeded?) by the Genode developers: https://genode.org/download/sculpt https://genode.org/download/sculpt I fetched their `sculpt-vc.img` and create qcow out of it to directly boot in qemu. $ qemu-img convert -f raw -O qcow2 sculpt-vc.img /var/lib/libvirt/images/sculpt-vc.qcow2 The resulting image is not bootable. It fails on boot showing Genode logo and goes into a reboot cycle. $ file sc* sculpt-vc.img: DOS/MBR boot sector, extended partition table (last) sculpt-vc.qcow2: QEMU QCOW2 Image (v3), 24375296 bytes
- lsofzz 8y agoI want to run this on qemu/kvm Linux. How?
- nickpsecurity 8y agoThey implement a Nizza-like architecture to let you choose how much risk you want for each part of your stack: https://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/papers_ps/nizza.pdf https://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/papers_ps/nizza.pdf It's also designed to allow separation kernels to be used in foundation. There's been quite a few of them: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.01535 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.01535
- posix_me_less 8y agoDo you think it is feasible, for a poweruser who can setup and debug linux installations, to setup and use GenodeOS or sel4 as of today as a main workstation with X applications on the level of Xfce, Firefox? (days, or months, or not at all?)
- nickpsecurity 8y agoI haven't used the recent version. Try it out. Tell us how well it works or doesnt. Preferably on hardware you know is supported.
- lsofzz 8y ago> Do you think it is feasible, for a poweruser who can setup and debug linux installations, to setup and use GenodeOS or sel4 as of today as a main workstation with X applications on the level of Xfce, Firefox? (days, or months, or not at all?) Coming from UNIX, used sculpt on QeMU just yesterday. Let me just say this - the exploration was pretty much just `meh`. But also - the devil is in the detail. I bet, if I read the documentation and then go back, I'll stop flaffing around too much and use it to do awesome things. I loved the ViM though ;)