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> No matter which attacker we want protection against, the points to secure are client and server, not the middle-boxes. > Here we are talking about implementi
by peterwwillis 8y ago
> No matter which attacker we want protection against, the points to secure are client and server, not the middle-boxes.
> Here we are talking about implementing security in hardware (bad idea: hard to upgrade as security requirements and practices chage) at a very low level (at data link layer). If this is to skip security at higher levels of the stack, you have to trust all hardware vendors and operators worldwide. If we don't, we can as well communicate on an insecure channel: that's what modern TLS provides.
So you're turning off WPA on your wireless router, I take it?
TLS is not a panacea, and there are many attack vectors for devices and applications throughout the entire network path. Defense in depth suggests security be applied wherever there is a vector.
- kstenerud 8y agoYou turn on WPA to stop other people from using your WIFI, and to provide a minimum level of protection for your non-encrypted communications (legacy apps). And, of course, every few years the current wireless protection systems are defeated, rendering the whole thing useless until you upgrade your hardware (because nobody wants to spend money to provide a software fix for something you've already bought).
- zamadatix 8y agoThe same could be said for TLS, this seems like you're strengthening the argument of defense in depth.
- kstenerud 8y agoTls is better than nothing, but still not that great. The best would be per app end to end encryption, but that would be a ton of work, and suffer from each implementations mistakes, so you're left with a trade-off between security and doability.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]