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I think it's important to reiterate that HTTPS only adds network privacy about what you download. The signing of repos and their packages means they're guarante

I think it's important to reiterate that HTTPS only adds network privacy about what you download. The signing of repos and their packages means they're guaranteed to be a pure copy of what's on the server. That same mechanism means you can easily make trusted mirrors on untrusted hosting.

yeaaaaaaaah 8y ago
Except the signing key was also downloaded over plain HTTP so all bets are off.
- j16sdiz 8y ago
  The pubkey is delivered with the CD and signed with gpg, listed on public server. This is no longer secure then trusting the CA list in the preinstall Windows in pc.
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]
  - rlucas 8y ago
    This is a good synthesis here -- downloading and trusting a key over HTTP is folly, but then, so is trusting much of anything that "just works." If the whole PKI approach is to work, client has got to get trusting that public key right. In regular practice, that probably means checking it against a HTTPS-delivered version of same from an authoritative domain. (How far down the rabbit hole do we go? Release managers speaking key hashes into instagram videos while holding up the day's New York Times?)
    - ecnahc515 8y ago
      You joke, but we've seen with machine learning you can fake those kinds of "proof" videos too :P
3pt14159 8y ago
No, it also adds security. If someone steals a signing key then they also need to steal the HTTPS cert. Or control the DNS records and generate a new one or switch to HTTP. Adding an extra layer of encryption is like adding more characters on a password. Sometimes it saves your bacon, sometimes it was useless and came with performance drawbacks. If you still disagree with me, that's fine. But I want to hear why you continue to hold this opinion when worked for 1Password during Cloudbleed. https://blog.1password.com/three-layers-of-encryption-keeps-you-safe-when-ssl/tls-fails/ https://blog.1password.com/three-layers-of-encryption-keeps-...
- oliwarner 8y ago
  In a scalar sense, sure. In a binary "do we have enough security" sense, less so. I realise that's a shitty quality of argument and I could have been more explicit but you can always add more security. Why, for example, aren't you demanding reproducible builds and signed source uploads? Simply put —and this is, I think, where we disagree— the signing of packages is enough. The design of Apt is such that it doesn't matter where you get your package from, it's that it matches an installed signature. Somebody could steal the key but they would then either need access to the repo or a targeted MitM on you. Network attacks are far from impossible but by the point you're organised to also steal a signing key, hitting somebody with a wrench or a dozen other plans become a much easier vector.
  - 3pt14159 8y ago
    The problem with the binary sense is that people misunderstand risk. For example, the blackout in 2003 was partially caused by the windows worm earlier in the day. Even though the computers that were used to control the power grid weren't running windows, the computers that monitored them were. So a routine alarm system bug ended up cascading into a power outage that lasted over a week in some places, including my home at the time. This was classified for a while. The people that programmed Windows before 2003 probably didn't consider their jobs with the full national security implications. Then you take something simple, like Linux on a simple IoT device. Say a smart electrical socket. Many of these devices went without updates for years. Doesn't seem all that bad, right? Just turn off a socket or turn it on? How bad could it be? At some point someone noticed that they were getting targeted and and said: "But why?" The reason is simple. You turn off 100k smart sockets all at once and the change in energy load can blow out certain parts of the grid. The point isn't that someone will get the key. The point is that we know the network is hostile. We know people lose signing keys. We know people are lazy with updates. From an economics perspective why is non-HTTPS justified? Right? A gig of data downloaded over HTTPS with modern ciphers costs about a penny for most connections in the developed world. To me, it's worth the cost.

yeaaaaaaaah 8y ago

Except the signing key was also downloaded over plain HTTP so all bets are off.

j16sdiz 8y ago
The pubkey is delivered with the CD and signed with gpg, listed on public server. This is no longer secure then trusting the CA list in the preinstall Windows in pc.
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
- rlucas 8y ago
  This is a good synthesis here -- downloading and trusting a key over HTTP is folly, but then, so is trusting much of anything that "just works." If the whole PKI approach is to work, client has got to get trusting that public key right. In regular practice, that probably means checking it against a HTTPS-delivered version of same from an authoritative domain. (How far down the rabbit hole do we go? Release managers speaking key hashes into instagram videos while holding up the day's New York Times?)
  - ecnahc515 8y ago
    You joke, but we've seen with machine learning you can fake those kinds of "proof" videos too :P

3pt14159 8y ago

No, it also adds security. If someone steals a signing key then they also need to steal the HTTPS cert. Or control the DNS records and generate a new one or switch to HTTP. Adding an extra layer of encryption is like adding more characters on a password. Sometimes it saves your bacon, sometimes it was useless and came with performance drawbacks. If you still disagree with me, that's fine. But I want to hear why you continue to hold this opinion when worked for 1Password during Cloudbleed. https://blog.1password.com/three-layers-of-encryption-keeps-you-safe-when-ssl/tls-fails/ https://blog.1password.com/three-layers-of-encryption-keeps-...

oliwarner 8y ago
In a scalar sense, sure. In a binary "do we have enough security" sense, less so. I realise that's a shitty quality of argument and I could have been more explicit but you can always add more security. Why, for example, aren't you demanding reproducible builds and signed source uploads? Simply put —and this is, I think, where we disagree— the signing of packages is enough. The design of Apt is such that it doesn't matter where you get your package from, it's that it matches an installed signature. Somebody could steal the key but they would then either need access to the repo or a targeted MitM on you. Network attacks are far from impossible but by the point you're organised to also steal a signing key, hitting somebody with a wrench or a dozen other plans become a much easier vector.
- 3pt14159 8y ago
  The problem with the binary sense is that people misunderstand risk. For example, the blackout in 2003 was partially caused by the windows worm earlier in the day. Even though the computers that were used to control the power grid weren't running windows, the computers that monitored them were. So a routine alarm system bug ended up cascading into a power outage that lasted over a week in some places, including my home at the time. This was classified for a while. The people that programmed Windows before 2003 probably didn't consider their jobs with the full national security implications. Then you take something simple, like Linux on a simple IoT device. Say a smart electrical socket. Many of these devices went without updates for years. Doesn't seem all that bad, right? Just turn off a socket or turn it on? How bad could it be? At some point someone noticed that they were getting targeted and and said: "But why?" The reason is simple. You turn off 100k smart sockets all at once and the change in energy load can blow out certain parts of the grid. The point isn't that someone will get the key. The point is that we know the network is hostile. We know people lose signing keys. We know people are lazy with updates. From an economics perspective why is non-HTTPS justified? Right? A gig of data downloaded over HTTPS with modern ciphers costs about a penny for most connections in the developed world. To me, it's worth the cost.