If human beings have a libertarian sort of free-will (the ability to do otherwise), then their actions can't be caused by God. So if we imagine a free-will cho

If human beings have a libertarian sort of free-will (the ability to do otherwise), then their actions can't be caused by God. So if we imagine a free-will choice, say whether or not to mow the lawn today, it's possible for me to either mow the lawn or not, thus creating two possible worlds (the one where I do or the one where I don't). God can't make me choose one way or the other, or rather, he can make me choose, but doing so makes the choice a non-libertarian-free one. According to Molinism, God knows both the future (what I will actually do), but also all counterfactuals (what I would do in any situation). He chose to create world we actually inhabit (the actual world), and there are many other worlds he could've created instead (actualizable worlds), but there are possible worlds that he could not have created, because many of the things that happen in those worlds are determined by the choices of free creatures. So a subset of possible worlds are actualizable. Plantinga is arguing that perhaps there are possible worlds with no evil, but none of them are actualizable. Speculatively: God decides the trade-off is worth it and creates the universe anyway. Perhaps a universe in which God himself redeems free creatures from sin is better than one without free creatures at all. Plantinga readily admits the speculation is just that. The important point is that the example illustrates a possible solution to the apparent paradox, so existence of evil and God's attributes aren't inconsistent. The actual solution may be something entirely different or even beyond our ability to comprehend. As to the point about omnipotence: It's a good one, but I think in the end it boils down to the classic "can God create a rock so heavy he can't lift it" objection, and theologians will readily constrain omnipotence so as not to include the logically impossible, or that which is incongruent with his own nature. So by extension, that some worlds aren't actualizable doesn't impinge on omnipotence because it flows (logically) out of the concept of libertarian freedom. Furthermore Molinism suggests a framework for thinking about how God can "ordain whatever comes to pass" if creatures have libertarian freedom. It's also worth mentioning that the concept of libertarian freedom is itself widely debated. I would suspect that the majority of theologians are compatibilists when it comes to this topic, and don't believe that creatures have this sort of free will at all. (see the westminster confession of faith 3.2 for example) Some even argue that the concept itself may be philosophically incoherent. Under a compatibilist view actualizable worlds and possible worlds are the same.