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The very definition of a "symbol" presupposes that there is some entity, which assigns meaning to that symbol. Well, unless you assume that the Nature itself co

The very definition of a "symbol" presupposes that there is some entity, which assigns meaning to that symbol. Well, unless you assume that the Nature itself conscious, it does not operate in the terms of symbols and symbolic computations. You can possibly claim that the elementary particles are the symbols of the Nature, and all the physical processes are computations involving such symbols but that would be a degenerate case, which won't help your argument. Mind is a natural phenomenon, which arises as a result of a certain physical process, in matter organized in a certain way. That is all. Until we learn why it happens in that type of matter, we would not be able to recreate minds.

naasking 8y ago
> The very definition of a "symbol" presupposes that there is some entity, which assigns meaning to that symbol No, that's not what's meant at all. Searle is making a distinction between syntax and semantics, where computers process only syntax (symbols are meaningless tokens), but humans can reason semantically, where propositions carry meaning. Both perform symbol processing, so "symbolic computation" is not a useful distinction here. Further, Searle is asserting that semantics cannot arise from syntax. But this is clearly false, as various methods of computational induction demonstrate: given only syntactic analysis of output bits, you can build a semantic model to predict subsequent bits. So what gives the symbols of the semantic model meaning? The correspondence of each symbol to real, observable objects. > Until we learn why it happens in that type of matter, we would not be able to recreate minds. You're assuming that consciousness requires some special property of matter. There's no justification for this assumption. Furthermore, you are arguing that we cannot create something that we do not fully understand. This too seems false. We created fire long before we understood it, for instance.
- IWeldMelons 8y ago
  > Both perform symbol processing Not sure about that. > So what gives the symbols of the semantic model meaning? The correspondence of each symbol to real, observable objects. And what decides what symbol corresponds to what real object? > You're assuming that consciousness requires some special property of matter. There's no justification for this assumption. Really? I thought that is something we have agreed upon. You are claiming that any system structured as a digital computer (hence, has a special property) is conscious, I am saying that it is not enough, it has to be structured some special way. > We created fire long before we understood it, for instance. This is a laughable argument. "We reproduce (as living beings do). therefore we create minds".
  - naasking 8y ago
    > You are claiming that any system structured as a digital computer (hence, has a special property) is conscious Nowhere did I make that claim. You're clearly confused about the arguments being made so I suggest your reread this thread. > And what decides what symbol corresponds to what real object? An inductive inference algorithm, like I said. > This is a laughable argument. "We reproduce (as living beings do). therefore we create minds". Exactly right. Therefore your claim that we must understand something before we can make it is trivially incorrect.

naasking 8y ago

> The very definition of a "symbol" presupposes that there is some entity, which assigns meaning to that symbol No, that's not what's meant at all. Searle is making a distinction between syntax and semantics, where computers process only syntax (symbols are meaningless tokens), but humans can reason semantically, where propositions carry meaning. Both perform symbol processing, so "symbolic computation" is not a useful distinction here. Further, Searle is asserting that semantics cannot arise from syntax. But this is clearly false, as various methods of computational induction demonstrate: given only syntactic analysis of output bits, you can build a semantic model to predict subsequent bits. So what gives the symbols of the semantic model meaning? The correspondence of each symbol to real, observable objects. > Until we learn why it happens in that type of matter, we would not be able to recreate minds. You're assuming that consciousness requires some special property of matter. There's no justification for this assumption. Furthermore, you are arguing that we cannot create something that we do not fully understand. This too seems false. We created fire long before we understood it, for instance.

IWeldMelons 8y ago
> Both perform symbol processing Not sure about that. > So what gives the symbols of the semantic model meaning? The correspondence of each symbol to real, observable objects. And what decides what symbol corresponds to what real object? > You're assuming that consciousness requires some special property of matter. There's no justification for this assumption. Really? I thought that is something we have agreed upon. You are claiming that any system structured as a digital computer (hence, has a special property) is conscious, I am saying that it is not enough, it has to be structured some special way. > We created fire long before we understood it, for instance. This is a laughable argument. "We reproduce (as living beings do). therefore we create minds".
- naasking 8y ago
  > You are claiming that any system structured as a digital computer (hence, has a special property) is conscious Nowhere did I make that claim. You're clearly confused about the arguments being made so I suggest your reread this thread. > And what decides what symbol corresponds to what real object? An inductive inference algorithm, like I said. > This is a laughable argument. "We reproduce (as living beings do). therefore we create minds". Exactly right. Therefore your claim that we must understand something before we can make it is trivially incorrect.