> Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all. Gee, I come to the o

> Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all. Gee, I come to the opposite conclusion. If we define what can be computed as what can be computed as a TM then we are TM's, that is, computers. I understand Searle to instead be offering an argument that humans are not TM's, that there is an aspect of computing in the world that is not captured by the definition that Turing gave, and it is whatever is involved in understanding. But the argument, as I hear it, concludes with something like "and it is obviously wrong to think this is what we are doing when we feel we understand something." That's not obvious, to me. > some vulgar symbolic computation I guess I still don't get it. I've not seen any evidence that what goes on between my ears is not doable this way, but I am very ready to concede that the jury is still out. I just don't understand the part where Searle says "obvious."