5 ms·
If the updates are cryptographically signed and validated, then it makes no difference. A MITM would just be giving free bandwidth to the VLC project. The best
by marcoperaza 8y ago
If the updates are cryptographically signed and validated, then it makes no difference. A MITM would just be giving free bandwidth to the VLC project.
The best argument is for defense-in-depth—in case someone breaks their signing scheme.
Edit: u/dcbadacd makes a great point about old but vulnerable versions potentially being served up by a MITM.
- cjbprime 8y agoThe issue says that the cryptographic checking is broken, and accepts new public keys as authoritative in the presence of MITM. Which makes the report totally valid, if true.
- mitchtbaum 8y agoVLC checks the downloaded file using the newly downloaded key??
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- jbk 8y agoThe issue is wrong.
- dcbadacd 8y agoThey are signed with 1024bit DSA with SHA1, every piece of that combination is considered obsolete cryptography nowadays. Even the NIST dictates you shouldn't sign anything new with that. Signing also doesn't stop serving old-and-vunerable-versions as the latest which is in my opinion a vunerability. Apt also has that vulnerability.
- marcoperaza 8y agoGood point about old-and-vulnerable versions. That seems like a strong argument in favor of using HTTPS. I’m curious why the Debian folks haven’t thought this a serious issue either. I’m going to try to dig up the discussions. But the use of a weak signing scheme is just an argument in favor of switching to a better signing scheme. Though I guess it is also real world evidence in favor of defense-in-depth.
- BTeam 8y agoVersion freezing attack can be done even if the client tries to connect over TLS, simply by dropping SYN requests to the update server, or by DNS manipulation, etc.
- marcoperaza 8y agoThat’s not quite the same attack. What you describe can only keep you from updating at all, freezing you at whatever your current version is. The attack described above would let the MITM choose the exact version to update you to.
- jbk 8y agoAbsolutely not: the installer blocks downgrade attacks.
- marcoperaza 8y agoI’m not talking about a downgrade attack. I’m talking about upgrading to a known vulnerable version. You are at version X, attacker upgrades you to known vulnerable version X+1, even though the real latest version X+2 has a fix.
- nyuszika7h 8y agoThere's a difference between "failed to contact update server" and "no new updates found", though. And DNS manipulation wouldn't work if certificate pinning is used.
- beering 8y agoHere's the scenario that the original reporter added: > if the update blob indicates a key other than the hardcoded one, it downloads the requested public key from the VLC update server over HTTP and does nothing further to verify the key itself. This means that all an attacker would have to do to serve a malicious update would be to sign it with their own key, then serve the matching public key when VLC requests it. I think they should've included this in the original report, because if true then it really changes the severity.
- marcoperaza 8y agoYeah, that changes everything if true. But the subsequent comments on the bug report allege that the new key is in fact verified against the hard-coded public key.