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I've often thought Searle's Chinese box argument was vapid, and have been unsure why so many seem to hold it in high regard. This article was helpful in this re

I've often thought Searle's Chinese box argument was vapid, and have been unsure why so many seem to hold it in high regard. This article was helpful in this regard; Searle seems to think that he can presume that are a set of rules that allow for translation; without knowing those rules (i.e., the "program"), the argument becomes uninteresting.

jimhefferon 8y ago
> vapid I'm not sure that is the right word, at least for me. I teach, and every once in a while a person asks a question that I just do not understand. It is a bad feeling; I am left standing in front of everyone saying "Could you repeat it in other words? Could you give another example?" I have that same feeling on reading Searle's paper, and on hearing him talk about it on In Our Time. He says a number of things that I agree with. Then he says, "Therefore obviously computers cannot understand Chinese." I'm left slackjawed, wondering whether some kind of type error happened or am I just too dumb? (Entirely possible, no doubt.) I don't have the `vapid' sense that I understand the argument and it is incorrect, rather I'm left with a sense of "What just happened?"
- IWeldMelons 8y ago
  He stressed on many occasions that computers can understand Chinese, but not the typical digital ones, programmed as simple symbolic manipulators.
  - naasking 8y ago
    Sounds like nonsense. There's no meaningful difference between digital computers and other kinds of physically realisable computers.
    - IWeldMelons 8y ago
      Well, the burden of proof is on you. The Turing-Church thesis is not a theorem, it is just a conjecture. It might be true, might be not true. Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all. But that was not my point. Digital computers could be, in principle, conscious, but the idea that you can construct a mind by making a symbolic program is flawed. Human brain could be, in fact, a digital computer, but the mind in it is not a result of some vulgar symbolic computation, but a result of some mysterious computational process, that very possibly has nothing to do with manipulations with some abstract symbols.
      - jimhefferon 8y ago
        > Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all. Gee, I come to the opposite conclusion. If we define what can be computed as what can be computed as a TM then we are TM's, that is, computers. I understand Searle to instead be offering an argument that humans are not TM's, that there is an aspect of computing in the world that is not captured by the definition that Turing gave, and it is whatever is involved in understanding. But the argument, as I hear it, concludes with something like "and it is obviously wrong to think this is what we are doing when we feel we understand something." That's not obvious, to me. > some vulgar symbolic computation I guess I still don't get it. I've not seen any evidence that what goes on between my ears is not doable this way, but I am very ready to concede that the jury is still out. I just don't understand the part where Searle says "obvious."
        IWeldMelons 8y ago
        Is not it a fallacy to search for the reasons why it is not doable? I gave my reasons in the other commentary, you may find them interesting.
        jimhefferon 8y ago
        > Is not it a fallacy to search for the reasons why it is not doable? I'm sorry, I'm not understanding. Are you asking if a person should look for types of computation that are more powerful then Turing machines? If so, I agree, you should.
      - naasking 8y ago
        > Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all We're not even Turing machines. The Bekenstein Bound establishes humans as finite state automata. > Human brain could be, in fact, a digital computer, but the mind in it is not a result of some vulgar symbolic computation, but a result of some mysterious computational process, that very possibly has nothing to do with manipulations with some abstract symbols. So a magical computer? What purpose in a brains computation does the magic serve exactly?
    - goatlover 8y ago
      There is a difference for Searle if only certain kinds of physical systems are conscious. The other issue in philosophy of mind is intentionality, which is how any physical system can be about something. Humans are both conscious and possess beliefs, desires and what not.
      - naasking 8y ago
        > There is a difference for Searle if only certain kinds of physical systems are conscious There is no meaningful difference here either. Physical systems also have bounded information content as per the Bekenstein Bound. > The other issue in philosophy of mind is intentionality, which is how any physical system can be about something I don't see the great disconnect here either. You have to treat systems of general intelligence as if they have intentions. What else is there?
- goatlover 8y ago
  I understand Searle's argument to be that symbol manipulation does not result in understanding. Understanding or semantics is something else. He seems to also want to tie consciousness into understanding. Some people would argue the symbols need to be grounded by experience, and experience has a conscious component.

jimhefferon 8y ago

> vapid I'm not sure that is the right word, at least for me. I teach, and every once in a while a person asks a question that I just do not understand. It is a bad feeling; I am left standing in front of everyone saying "Could you repeat it in other words? Could you give another example?" I have that same feeling on reading Searle's paper, and on hearing him talk about it on In Our Time. He says a number of things that I agree with. Then he says, "Therefore obviously computers cannot understand Chinese." I'm left slackjawed, wondering whether some kind of type error happened or am I just too dumb? (Entirely possible, no doubt.) I don't have the `vapid' sense that I understand the argument and it is incorrect, rather I'm left with a sense of "What just happened?"

IWeldMelons 8y ago
He stressed on many occasions that computers can understand Chinese, but not the typical digital ones, programmed as simple symbolic manipulators.
- naasking 8y ago
  Sounds like nonsense. There's no meaningful difference between digital computers and other kinds of physically realisable computers.
  - IWeldMelons 8y ago
    Well, the burden of proof is on you. The Turing-Church thesis is not a theorem, it is just a conjecture. It might be true, might be not true. Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all. But that was not my point. Digital computers could be, in principle, conscious, but the idea that you can construct a mind by making a symbolic program is flawed. Human brain could be, in fact, a digital computer, but the mind in it is not a result of some vulgar symbolic computation, but a result of some mysterious computational process, that very possibly has nothing to do with manipulations with some abstract symbols.
    - jimhefferon 8y ago
      > Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all. Gee, I come to the opposite conclusion. If we define what can be computed as what can be computed as a TM then we are TM's, that is, computers. I understand Searle to instead be offering an argument that humans are not TM's, that there is an aspect of computing in the world that is not captured by the definition that Turing gave, and it is whatever is involved in understanding. But the argument, as I hear it, concludes with something like "and it is obviously wrong to think this is what we are doing when we feel we understand something." That's not obvious, to me. > some vulgar symbolic computation I guess I still don't get it. I've not seen any evidence that what goes on between my ears is not doable this way, but I am very ready to concede that the jury is still out. I just don't understand the part where Searle says "obvious."
      - IWeldMelons 8y ago
        Is not it a fallacy to search for the reasons why it is not doable? I gave my reasons in the other commentary, you may find them interesting.
        jimhefferon 8y ago
        > Is not it a fallacy to search for the reasons why it is not doable? I'm sorry, I'm not understanding. Are you asking if a person should look for types of computation that are more powerful then Turing machines? If so, I agree, you should.
    - naasking 8y ago
      > Now, if you define a physical computer as a Turing machine and nothing else than yeah, we, humans might as well be not computers at all We're not even Turing machines. The Bekenstein Bound establishes humans as finite state automata. > Human brain could be, in fact, a digital computer, but the mind in it is not a result of some vulgar symbolic computation, but a result of some mysterious computational process, that very possibly has nothing to do with manipulations with some abstract symbols. So a magical computer? What purpose in a brains computation does the magic serve exactly?
  - goatlover 8y ago
    There is a difference for Searle if only certain kinds of physical systems are conscious. The other issue in philosophy of mind is intentionality, which is how any physical system can be about something. Humans are both conscious and possess beliefs, desires and what not.
    - naasking 8y ago
      > There is a difference for Searle if only certain kinds of physical systems are conscious There is no meaningful difference here either. Physical systems also have bounded information content as per the Bekenstein Bound. > The other issue in philosophy of mind is intentionality, which is how any physical system can be about something I don't see the great disconnect here either. You have to treat systems of general intelligence as if they have intentions. What else is there?
goatlover 8y ago
I understand Searle's argument to be that symbol manipulation does not result in understanding. Understanding or semantics is something else. He seems to also want to tie consciousness into understanding. Some people would argue the symbols need to be grounded by experience, and experience has a conscious component.