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Yes, it's just safer. We do this _all the time_ in the Web PKI. Remember the "Debian weak keys"? What's weak about those particular keys? Nothing. Nothing wha
by tialaramex 8y ago
Yes, it's just safer. We do this _all the time_ in the Web PKI.
Remember the "Debian weak keys"? What's weak about those particular keys?
Nothing. Nothing whatsoever. Those keys aren't special in any way. Except, Debian shipped releases that always picked one of these key pairs. So anyone with a mind to can go find the list of private keys that corresponds to these particular public keys and thus we don't let you use those public keys any more.
(You can go try this if you don't believe me, submit a CSR to your preferred public CA asking for a certificate for one of the Debian Weak Keys, it will be rejected and there may or may not be an explanation attached saying your keys are crap and to get new ones)
Whole swathes of keys are blacklisted. ROCA is another example, somebody took one mathematical short-cut too many in their optimised design for RSA key generation, and so the resulting keys all have this very obvious structure that's exploitable (not easily, but enough that a sovereign entity could definitely break them). So we just blacklisted all those keys.
If you pick truly random keys you'll never notice this in a lifetime because of statistics, it's just some code on the issuer's systems that you never need to care about.