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The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; rather than weakening encryption to enable network owners

The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; rather than weakening encryption to enable network owners to analyze traffic on their network (which also harms dissidents who need secure network access), I would prefer a push for more trustworthy devices. The devices we own should be acting in our own best interest; we shouldn't need to treat them as adversaries.

rocqua 8y ago
> The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Your point about dissidents needing secure access is a strong one. Any way to MitM a connection for audit purposes can be repurposed into an MitM for surveillance given enough coercion. However, I don't think this applies to a network connection between my TV and Samsung. Once a surveillor coerces me to give them access, I can disconnect my TV from the internet. The same goes for an amazon echo, or a juice press with WiFi. It is different with whatsapp, facebook and internet banking. These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent.
- ryukafalz 8y ago
  >A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Sure, but you can also look at the device's communication if you have administrative access to it yourself, rather than trying to MITM it. I suppose this could be a vulnerability itself if done poorly, but users have administrative access to their PCs; why should other devices they own be any different? >These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent. If the user gives consent, they should be allowed to inspect the connection. The device's UI can make it _very clear_ that they're about to do something dangerous, but it's their device and should be their choice.
- AWildC182 8y ago
  If you actually were to carry out an audit of a device you'd request source code, not the SSL key. If device manufacturers want you to trust their stuff, they need to stop locking bootloaders. Wanting stuff to be SSL-free for auditability is like asking for web pages to be fully renderable on lynx so you can scrape them
deleted 8y ago
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meuk 8y ago
Another problem is that nowadays, all devices need internet to do anything. It's ridiculous. Even offline gaming is impossible for most platforms/games.
mdpopescu 8y ago
The devices we own should be acting in our own best interest; we shouldn't need to treat them as adversaries. This reminds me of Programming Satan's Computer [1] (PDF link), the first time I understood that while programming is hard, security programming is absolutely insane. [1] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/satan.pdf https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/satan.pdf

rocqua 8y ago

> The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Your point about dissidents needing secure access is a strong one. Any way to MitM a connection for audit purposes can be repurposed into an MitM for surveillance given enough coercion. However, I don't think this applies to a network connection between my TV and Samsung. Once a surveillor coerces me to give them access, I can disconnect my TV from the internet. The same goes for an amazon echo, or a juice press with WiFi. It is different with whatsapp, facebook and internet banking. These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent.

ryukafalz 8y ago
>A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Sure, but you can also look at the device's communication if you have administrative access to it yourself, rather than trying to MITM it. I suppose this could be a vulnerability itself if done poorly, but users have administrative access to their PCs; why should other devices they own be any different? >These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent. If the user gives consent, they should be allowed to inspect the connection. The device's UI can make it _very clear_ that they're about to do something dangerous, but it's their device and should be their choice.
AWildC182 8y ago
If you actually were to carry out an audit of a device you'd request source code, not the SSL key. If device manufacturers want you to trust their stuff, they need to stop locking bootloaders. Wanting stuff to be SSL-free for auditability is like asking for web pages to be fully renderable on lynx so you can scrape them

deleted 8y ago

[deleted]

meuk 8y ago

Another problem is that nowadays, all devices need internet to do anything. It's ridiculous. Even offline gaming is impossible for most platforms/games.

mdpopescu 8y ago

The devices we own should be acting in our own best interest; we shouldn't need to treat them as adversaries. This reminds me of Programming Satan's Computer [1] (PDF link), the first time I understood that while programming is hard, security programming is absolutely insane. [1] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/satan.pdf https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/satan.pdf