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Postwar analysis Postwar analysis placed the overall accuracy of daylight precision attacks with the Norden at about the same level as radar bombing efforts. T

Postwar analysis Postwar analysis placed the overall accuracy of daylight precision attacks with the Norden at about the same level as radar bombing efforts. The 8th Air Force put 31.8% of its bombs within 300 metres (1,000 ft) from an average altitude of 6,400 metres (21,000 ft), the 15th Air Force averaged 30.78% from 6,200 metres (20,500 ft), and the 20th Air Force against Japan averaged 31% from 5,000 metres (16,500 ft).[46] Many factors have been put forth to explain the Norden's poor real-world performance. ... from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norden_bombsight#Postwar_analysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norden_bombsight#Postwar_analy...

smacktoward 8y ago
The story of the Norden bombsight is remarkable in a whole bunch of different ways. 1) As an historic example of the US putting an inordinate amount of faith in high-tech solutions to military problems, only to be disappointed with how those solutions actually performed when they reached the field. (This story being a hardy perennial: see also the Browning Automatic Rifle, the Mark 14 torpedo, the M16 rifle, the F-111 fighter, the M2 Bradley AFV, the F-35 strike fighter, etc. etc. etc.) 2) As a cautionary tale of building your security plan around the wrong threat model: Nordens in the field were subject to extraordinary security measures to prevent them falling into enemy hands, none of which mattered because the Germans had a spy inside the Norden plant who had already passed them the plans for the bombsight three years before the U.S. even entered the war (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duquesne_Spy_Ring#Herman_W._Lang https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duquesne_Spy_Ring#Herman_W._La...). 3) As an early example of PR prowess from what would become known as the military-industrial complex: while the bombsight itself was kind of a dud, the Carl L. Norden Company (with the eager assistance of the USAAF) were adept at selling it to the public as a kind of wonder-weapon. As an example, here's a 1943 story from Life magazine about Norden partnering with the Ringling Bros. circus to work the bombsight into a show in Madison Square Garden: https://books.google.com/books?id=EU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA27&ots=NweZxvCOCQ&dq=norden%20bombsight%20circus&pg=PA27#v=onepage&q=norden%20bombsight%20circus&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=EU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA27&ots=...
- neetdeth 8y ago
  Absent from this list: Laser guided bombs, thermal imaging systems, the F-15 Eagle, the Tomahawk cruise missile, the M1A1 Abrams tank, etc. etc. Examples of high tech solutions to military problems that produced extremely favorable lopsided outcomes when they reached the field. Any military that places inordinate faith in low tech solutions is liable to lose most of their armor and infantry to an aggressor that they can't even see, much less fight. That seems like the much greater hazard.
  - smacktoward 8y ago
    > Any military that places inordinate faith in low tech solutions is liable to lose most of their armor and infantry to an aggressor that they can't even see, much less fight This would of course come as news to the Russians, who absolutely creamed the much-higher-tech Germans in WW2. It turns out that five lower-tech tanks that start reliably are worth more than one high-tech tank that doesn't. It's also worth noting that none of the technologies you list have ever been deployed in the field against a real peer competitor, and many have never been used in combat in the roles they were originally intended for. (The F-15 was designed as an interceptor, for instance, but in actual combat has mostly been used as a strike fighter. The M1 was designed to fight Soviet T-72 and T-80 tanks, which it has never had a chance to do -- even at the one real armor battle it has taken part in, the Battle of 73 Easting in 1991, it faced less capable export-version T-72s alongside older T-55 and T-62 derivatives.)
    - anonlastname 8y ago
      The Russian strategy during WWII and the winter war only "worked" because they accepted an enormous loss of troops to compensate for all of their other shortcomings. During the Winter War especially, Russian troops lacked equipment such as white camouflage and a single Finnish sniper killed at least 500 Russian troops. This strategy may have worked, but it's not acceptable.
      - mulmen 8y ago

smacktoward 8y ago

The story of the Norden bombsight is remarkable in a whole bunch of different ways. 1) As an historic example of the US putting an inordinate amount of faith in high-tech solutions to military problems, only to be disappointed with how those solutions actually performed when they reached the field. (This story being a hardy perennial: see also the Browning Automatic Rifle, the Mark 14 torpedo, the M16 rifle, the F-111 fighter, the M2 Bradley AFV, the F-35 strike fighter, etc. etc. etc.) 2) As a cautionary tale of building your security plan around the wrong threat model: Nordens in the field were subject to extraordinary security measures to prevent them falling into enemy hands, none of which mattered because the Germans had a spy inside the Norden plant who had already passed them the plans for the bombsight three years before the U.S. even entered the war (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duquesne_Spy_Ring#Herman_W._Lang https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duquesne_Spy_Ring#Herman_W._La...). 3) As an early example of PR prowess from what would become known as the military-industrial complex: while the bombsight itself was kind of a dud, the Carl L. Norden Company (with the eager assistance of the USAAF) were adept at selling it to the public as a kind of wonder-weapon. As an example, here's a 1943 story from Life magazine about Norden partnering with the Ringling Bros. circus to work the bombsight into a show in Madison Square Garden: https://books.google.com/books?id=EU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA27&ots=NweZxvCOCQ&dq=norden%20bombsight%20circus&pg=PA27#v=onepage&q=norden%20bombsight%20circus&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=EU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA27&ots=...

neetdeth 8y ago
Absent from this list: Laser guided bombs, thermal imaging systems, the F-15 Eagle, the Tomahawk cruise missile, the M1A1 Abrams tank, etc. etc. Examples of high tech solutions to military problems that produced extremely favorable lopsided outcomes when they reached the field. Any military that places inordinate faith in low tech solutions is liable to lose most of their armor and infantry to an aggressor that they can't even see, much less fight. That seems like the much greater hazard.
- smacktoward 8y ago
  > Any military that places inordinate faith in low tech solutions is liable to lose most of their armor and infantry to an aggressor that they can't even see, much less fight This would of course come as news to the Russians, who absolutely creamed the much-higher-tech Germans in WW2. It turns out that five lower-tech tanks that start reliably are worth more than one high-tech tank that doesn't. It's also worth noting that none of the technologies you list have ever been deployed in the field against a real peer competitor, and many have never been used in combat in the roles they were originally intended for. (The F-15 was designed as an interceptor, for instance, but in actual combat has mostly been used as a strike fighter. The M1 was designed to fight Soviet T-72 and T-80 tanks, which it has never had a chance to do -- even at the one real armor battle it has taken part in, the Battle of 73 Easting in 1991, it faced less capable export-version T-72s alongside older T-55 and T-62 derivatives.)
  - anonlastname 8y ago
    The Russian strategy during WWII and the winter war only "worked" because they accepted an enormous loss of troops to compensate for all of their other shortcomings. During the Winter War especially, Russian troops lacked equipment such as white camouflage and a single Finnish sniper killed at least 500 Russian troops. This strategy may have worked, but it's not acceptable.
    - mulmen 8y ago