I like this article. I want to correct something on C and C++ side. He hints it's barely possible to write correct C. He doesnt mention how safety-critical sec

I like this article. I want to correct something on C and C++ side. He hints it's barely possible to write correct C. He doesnt mention how safety-critical sector, esp regulated, cranks out reliable C on a regular basis. They use C subsets with careful coding, reviews, and every automated tool they can. Static analyzers, automated testing, you name it. There's also analyzers that, when they work, can prove absence of entire classes of errors. RV-Match, Astree Analyzer (used by Airbus), and Frama-C are examples. CompCert eliminates compiler errors afterward. Most security-critical development doesnt use tools like these even when companies can afford them. It's apathy, not technological capability. Now, C++ is special given it was designed to reduce risks of using C. Yet, almost all the verification tooling was for C and Java. C++ is just so complicated that it's hard to statically analyze or even build tools for. That means a C program done like above might have fewer errors than a C++ program. For that reason, I recommend avoiding C++ in favor of either C or safe systems languages compiling to C to take advantage of its verification tooling. They're getting hit with these vulnerabilities because they using a harder-to-analyze language possibly with coding strategy that adds difficulty. See Cleanroom Software Engineering or Praxis's Correct-by-Construction for examples of low-defect, development strategy.