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51% attackers mine in secret. Basically, you spend your coins today, while controlling a 51% share. When everyone else's 49% hash-power creates 98 blocks, your
by dragontamer 8y ago
51% attackers mine in secret.
Basically, you spend your coins today, while controlling a 51% share. When everyone else's 49% hash-power creates 98 blocks, your 51% share will create 102 blocks.
But secretly. That's the key. Now that your chain is +4 ahead (or wait even longer and become +10 ahead), you can spend your coins on the public chain. Then, you publish your 102 alternative blocks (which barely adds any hash power to the chain), and spend your coins again on the 2nd chain.
A 51% is the end-all-be-all for a cryptocoin. If you're vulnerable to the 51% attack, the coin is effectively worthless.
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The only way to beat a 51% attack is to build more hash power than the attackers. IE: Prevent the attackers from getting to 51%.
- koolba 8y agoOr wait for many more confirms that the attack is impractical.
- dragontamer 8y agoI'm not sure that is possible. If a 51% attack for 1-week costs $1-million USD to pull off (hypothetical round numbers against a hypothetical coin)... then how many confirms do you wait for? If you wait for 1008 confirms (for a transaction of $1 Million USD), then that doesn't stop the attack at all. After all, the attacker simply has to perform $2 Million USD worth of double-spends during that timeframe to make a profit. (Not necessarily with you, but across the entire blockchain). After waiting 1008 confirms (1-week for a 10 minute/block coin), the attacker simply replaces those 1008 blocks with his 1049 secret-blocks and makes his chain the longest. That means that ALL spends for the past week are nullified, allowing the attacker to double-spend his coins on the new blockchain. ---------- In effect, waiting for 1000-confirms (or whatever) is closing the barn door after the horse has bolted. It doesn't protect your transaction... it protects the NEXT GUY's transaction. In any case, the attacker gets to double-spend his money, which probably includes a large exchange (where you can turn coins into US Dollars easily).
- koolba 8y agoIf the attacker has 50+% of mining power for the entire duration then yes it wouldn’t work as the longer things stretch out the further ahead the attacker gets (statistically). However it the attacker has less than 50% they can still wage an attack. With 10% of mining power I’ve got a 1% chance of mining consecutive blocks. It dwindles quickly even for larger percentages and a large number of confirms makes that angle impractical.
- dragontamer 8y ago> However it the attacker has less than 50% they can still wage an attack. With 10% of mining power I’ve got a 1% chance of mining consecutive blocks. It dwindles quickly even for larger percentages and a large number of confirms makes that angle impractical. ETC's blockchain just had over 100+ blocks change, according to the tweet. Even with 40% of the mining power, the probability of such an event (40% mining power, 100 consecutive blocks) is 0.000000000000000000000000000000000000016%. That's a very unlikely hypothesis you're presenting.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- labster 8y agoIf only we had a currency that was immune to 51% attacks because a government was willing to use force to preserve its value, and therefore doesn't need a massive use of energy for its proof of work.
- askmike 8y agoWe call it a 51% attack an attack, but from the perspective of PoW it's always about the chain with the most work. Anyone is just as valid as anyone else to propose blocks. That's the point of Bitcoin: a way to always figure what the truth is, and make it as expensive as possible for people to attack/change this truth. The only problem here is that PoW only knows one cost: hashing, and due to macro shifts in mining hardware this can sometimes go down a lot more than the value of a coin (which makes the cost of this attack worth it). As soon as you start introducing measures to subvert this attack you are subverting either decentralization or stability. If you for example program clients to not accept reorgs deeper than 10 blocks (for example) you simply introduce new attack vectors that can split the network (into following different chains - which is even scarier than 51% attacks). If every x blocks you snapshot the chain and force everyone to follow that snapshot you just centralized the chain, etc.
- kordlessagain 8y agoSplitting the network causes it to become a marketing problem.
- rini17 8y agoDue to probabilistic nature of most PoW protocols, you don't actually need to have the chain with the most work. Attacker can keep trying till they are are lucky, with less than 50% hashpower.
- dpark 8y agoIn the same way you can endlessly throw money at the craps table until you get lucky and bankrupt the casino?