I’ve got 16 years in as a Light Infantry Senior NCO. I’ve also led and conducted Lean StartUp focused sprints to work this specific problem, internal to defenc

I’ve got 16 years in as a Light Infantry Senior NCO. I’ve also led and conducted Lean StartUp focused sprints to work this specific problem, internal to defence Weight carried by soldiers is a critical problem. I’ve carried in excess of 50kg on Operations, verified. During my Infantry Platoon Commander’s Course we carried in excess of 50kg for weeks, verified. I’m 78kg and carry 25kg for 50-70km per week(in 10-20km increments, done for over 1 year) on the beach for fitness. My own long term personal experience mimics the article linked Project Payne. Carrying 1/3 body weight is easily trainable and sustainable. Carrying 2/3 body weight, especially over undulating or complex terrain is a recipe for long-term joint/orthopaedic disaster. I have peers in their 30’s who have had hip replacements due to injuries sustained from sustained carriage of too much weight in training. The article mentions 2 things: 1)“Soldiers carry 100 pounds of the lightest kit possible” 2)UK Army Project Payne, too much weight carried “just in case” New capabilities particularly around communication networks carried by all subunits(dismounted section/squid level) are increasing weight significantly. The “weight carried” modelling has been done, and their is no current solution. In my experience, the ever increasing weight carried by dismounted Infantry is not risk aversion as stated in the article, but risk shift. While it’s not a tortoise versus hare binary choice, it is a continuum of weight carried. Turning dismounted Infantry soldiers into armoured tortoises not only shifts the risk towards increased long-term orthopedic/muscular/skeletal health risk of soldiers, but increased risk in lower operational capacity/capability due to reduced speed/range of operation. In light of politicised efforts to nudge induction of more women in combat arms, the increased average weight carried combined with decreasing average stature and fitness levels of soldiers is a guarantee of increased long-term health consequences. But the risk of crippling 100 soldiers tomorrow is viewed as acceptable over 1 soldier killed on Operations today. I would suggest a machine learning system to log and analyze weight carried both in training and on operations that incorporates all known environmental and operational factors to recommend what is carried and what is left behind, to reduce the “just in case” factor, but I believe culture would have to change as well or risk a Patrol/Section/Platoon NCO filling the void again. Personally, I’m for starting from scratch again and looking towards the highly effective RLI of the 1970’s, at least in terms of counter insurgency. Rifle, 5 magazines, two water bottles, two grenades, wearing shorts and high top sneakers. More hare, less tortoise. Much like current modern special operations direct action doctrine applied to conventional forces. But as we shift from counter-insurgency focus back towards peer or near peer combined arms capable threats, this is not going to happen. We will continue to carry more weight unless senior leadership, unit command, and subunit NCOs we can trust rapid “just in time” battlefield logistics.