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Yeah, I agree. The older versions would pop up a warning and force you to acknowledge it, but it felt like something that would have driven away casual users wh

by tass 8y ago

Yeah, I agree. The older versions would pop up a warning and force you to acknowledge it, but it felt like something that would have driven away casual users who maybe didn't understand or care about the implications. In saying that, the previous behaviour can be restored (for you) but you can't force it onto users who are communicating with you.

em-bee 8y ago
what is the actual threat here? if bob looses his number either he is able to somehow change the number on his account before that happens, in which case alice will get a fingerprint change once, and then when the old number is reactivated by ted and he manages to break into bobs account and then sends a message to alice, then alice would get another finger-print change from bobs account. assuming that she ignores the change, the failure would be noticed when bob sends another message to alice as now the finger-print would change back to bobs, marking teds as coming from a different identity. this would be detectable in the client. unclear is how did ted get into bobs account? if bob changed the phone number. i am assuming that shouldn't even be possible, so i believe we can in fact ignore this threat. it looks differen't though if bob can not reactivate his old account, in which case alice will connect to bobs new account, and hopefully disconnect the old one. if ted gets the number and reactivates bobs old account then if alice did disconnect, she would notice a reconnect attempt from a new id and treat it like any new connect. if the connect verification doesn't involve the senders phone number then having bobs old number doesn't give ted any advantage. if alice did not disconnect the old account, she will notice the account being reactivated, and now have two bobs talking to her, raising suspicion. so it appears the only threat is coming from the case where bob looses his number and does not reconnect to alice with a new number. so alice is unaware that bob changed his number. this can happen if bob and alice communicate rarely...

by tass 8y ago

em-bee 8y ago

what is the actual threat here? if bob looses his number either he is able to somehow change the number on his account before that happens, in which case alice will get a fingerprint change once, and then when the old number is reactivated by ted and he manages to break into bobs account and then sends a message to alice, then alice would get another finger-print change from bobs account. assuming that she ignores the change, the failure would be noticed when bob sends another message to alice as now the finger-print would change back to bobs, marking teds as coming from a different identity. this would be detectable in the client. unclear is how did ted get into bobs account? if bob changed the phone number. i am assuming that shouldn't even be possible, so i believe we can in fact ignore this threat. it looks differen't though if bob can not reactivate his old account, in which case alice will connect to bobs new account, and hopefully disconnect the old one. if ted gets the number and reactivates bobs old account then if alice did disconnect, she would notice a reconnect attempt from a new id and treat it like any new connect. if the connect verification doesn't involve the senders phone number then having bobs old number doesn't give ted any advantage. if alice did not disconnect the old account, she will notice the account being reactivated, and now have two bobs talking to her, raising suspicion. so it appears the only threat is coming from the case where bob looses his number and does not reconnect to alice with a new number. so alice is unaware that bob changed his number. this can happen if bob and alice communicate rarely...