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> The wholly grail of cryptocurrency today is not optimizing anonymity but... complying with the complex regulations around KYC and criminal and terrorist finan
by antidesitter 8y ago
> The wholly grail of cryptocurrency today is not optimizing anonymity but... complying with the complex regulations around KYC and criminal and terrorist financing.
What the... That’s not the goal of cryptocurrency according to its creators. The goal is, as you stated later, “to opt out of government surveillance”, which is incompatible with the former. You’re contradicting yourself.
- yholio 8y agoThere is a contradiction between privacy and law enforcement only if you think in rudimentary, white/black extremes. Why don't you allow for shades of gray, workable anonymity that protects most regular people yet can be lifted by law enforcement in a auditable and costly process that rules out mass surveillance? Why can't we have crypto-banks that know you identity yet can't freeze your assets, only atest to them when compelled so by law? Can you mathematically prove such constructs are not possible? Is there a possibility they could serve society's needs better than either the current banking system or the Bitcoin-style hodge-podge?
- antidesitter 8y agoPlease explain how you can have anonimity if it can be lifted by law enforcement. The selling point of cryptocurrencies is not being beholden to the whims of a government.
- yholio 8y agoYou can have limited anonymity and the option of hiding into the crowds. To give a very crude example, a FBI backdoor key established in the genesis block could allow them to publish into the blockchain a personal information fetch request that is public and has a public field that the agency is expected to populate with relevant court order number. They could of course issue requests without that field, but in that case everyone could see their behavior and laws could be passed to make it illegal. A further refinement would be to request a financial bond before the operation is executed. This bond could increase exponentially, guaranteeing the backdoor cannot be abused for mass surveillance and is employed for limited, high profile cases. The "whims of a government" are often the expression of strong social forces that exist for a reason. Rejecting any form of social governance is an Utopian political construction at it's core, masquerading here as technology.
- antidesitter 8y agoThere are so many problems with your proposal it's hard to know where to begin. I'm going to guess you're American. It might be news to you, but the rest of the world (and many Americans) don't want to be subjected to the United States government and its inane laws. You might love your government and think it does no wrong, but we don't. And it has a terrible track record. Moreover, what are you going to do when the inevitable happens and this "supersecret backdoor key" is leaked? Your system is a ticking time bomb. > They could of course issue requests without that field Your "field" is useless then. > but in that case everyone could see their behavior and laws could be passed to make it illegal. Then what would be the point of allowing it in the first place? > The "whims of a government" are often the expression of strong social forces that exist for a reason. "Strong social forces" doesn't mean "good social forces". You have an incredibly naive view of how governments work if you think otherwise.
- yholio 8y agoThose are straw-men against a conceptual example intended to show that a trade-off is possible. All the problems you rise have solutions in a practical system, you could issue the key to an international organization such as the INTERPOL, treaties could be set-up beforehand so only lawful use of the field is permitted, key revocation is a thing etc. Or you could move away from a centralised governance altogether and have a stake voting system where the actual users decide to de-annonimize a particularly user. Or we can imagine a weak form of privacy where cooperation among your trading partners can reveal more and more information, a al e-cash with blind signatures, where a double spend reveals your identity. In short, the question is if "absolutely private money transfers" are something we need and want, not if there are technical ways to gradually weaken privacy in a socially controlled fashion.
- antidesitter 8y ago> All the problems you rise have solutions in a practical system Hand-waving is not a valid way to address fundamental problems with your proposal. > you could issue the key to an international organization such as the INTERPOL Interpol? Haha, no thanks [1]. You also haven't addressed the key being leaked, which would destroy your proposed system. > treaties could be set-up beforehand so only lawful use of the field is permitted Yeah, that tends to work very well in the real world. > key revocation is a thing So who can revoke this supersecret magic key, and under what conditions? If you don't specify that, this statement is as good as meaningless. > a stake voting system where the actual users decide to de-annonimize a particularly user Which “actual users”? Literally everyone? You're going to have to explain the details of your proposed deanonimization system because as it stands it's completely vague. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpol#Criticism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpol#Criticism
- Winslow_Strong 8y agoDusk is trying to walk this line