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I'm not sure I agree with the idea "The sending of the bills with the “Thank you for paying” note could not have been understood by any reasonable person to con

I'm not sure I agree with the idea "The sending of the bills with the “Thank you for paying” note could not have been understood by any reasonable person to constitute a claim of any kind." Since the debt had not in fact been paid at the time the bill was sent, I would interpret this as a passive-aggressive but clear order to pay it: in other words, as a claim. I do not think I am alone in this, given that a jury seems to have come to the same conclusion unanimously. In fact, I'm having trouble understanding how this could be interpreted as anything else. If you want to hold protests saying that the USDA ought to be paying people's personal debts, there are lots of ways to do that. They do not include filing illegitimate claims through the claim system.

Finnucane 8y ago
It does seem to be skirting an issue of intent. Glaub can't make a 'claim' because there's not a system in place for any such claim to be a real claim. His protest as such is that he believes such a system should exist. Does he have an expectation that somehow a payment will be made, or not? I do see the point that if the court says, well, the jury has to decide that point, and then refuses to direct the jury to decide that point, that's a problem too.
zozbot123 8y ago
The problem is not whether "the sending of the bills with the “Thank you for paying” note could... have been understood by any reasonable person to constitute a claim of any kind." It is that the jury was not properly instructed that they would have to decide this as a matter of fact, and that Glaub's free speech was otherwise protected. It's a subtle procedural issue, but ISTM that the article author has a point.