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I said these arguments were unserious. I said this before, just scroll back. "Neither of these are serious, engaged-with-the-actual-topic sorts of arguments. "
by pvg 8y ago
I said these arguments were unserious. I said this before, just scroll back.
"Neither of these are serious, engaged-with-the-actual-topic sorts of arguments. "
That's the bit I stand by.
- lisper 8y agoYou left out some important context: "first you claim that an iOS image is a black obelisk fathomless to man and when challenged and essentially forced to concede this is completely inaccurate you fall back on saying your position is generally right and what's more, both right and unfalsifiable because of Archangels Turing & Church. Neither of these are serious..." You're right, neither of those are serious. But neither of those are my argument. So I guess we actually agree about that.
- pvg 8y agoOk, let's wrap this up since I don't believe you're actually interested in making an argument but in writhing out of whatever corner you've decided to plant your flag in. This is a thing you said: "But I can always fall back on the fact that to prove that there are no security holes in iOS you would have to solve the halting problem" This is not a serious argument. You can say it about anything and declare up-front that no matter what, you're going to be 'right'. It would be mildly amusing in a dorm room chat around a bong. It's an embarrassment to say it in full seriousness and then indignantly point at your CS PhD. Now you won't even admit you even made it. The (now-distant) sibling comment is right - even in the unlikely event we moved past this, your next Atlantic Wall would be Penrose quantum consciousness.
- lisper 8y ago> This is not a serious argument. Why not? Do you not believe that it is true? > You can say it about anything Well, yes, the halting problem does have some rather far-reaching consequences. (There's a reason Turing is famous.) But there is an important sense in which the halting problem is relevant here: security is adversarial, and so the limits on computability matter more than they do in a non-adversarial context. In a non-adversarial context, the odds that my system will behave according to some simplified model are higher than in an adversarial context, and that often makes reliable analysis feasible, the halting problem notwithstanding. BTW, I am not waving my Ph.D. around to convince you that I'm right. I'm waving it around to try to persuade you that if you disagree with me, it might be because I have a point that you are failing to grasp, and it might be worth your while trying to understand what that point is even -- perhaps especially -- if it turns out to be wrong. But simply proclaiming my argument to be "non-serious" is not a productive first step.
- pvg 8y agoDo you not believe that it is true? Of course I believe it's true. I also believe it's true that there is a non-zero probability that if my phone were stolen, the air molecules around the fingerprint sensor could spontaneously come to an electromechanical arrangement that unlocks it, giving the thief full access to my bank account and terrible taste in music. I (and I imagine you) don't claim I was late to an appointment because of heretofore unforeseen difficulties in hidden-variable theory.
- lisper 8y agoNow you are the one raising non-serious arguments. The probability of quantum fluctuations unlocking your phone is indistinguishable from zero. On the other hand, the probability of a skilled adversary introducing a back door that evades known methods of detection is very much distinguishable from zero. Heck, the probability of a bug introducing a back door that evades known methods of detection (at least for a while) is distinguishable from zero! That's why jailbreaks are possible.
- pvg 8y agoNo. You explicitly said (I quoted you verbatim about it more than once) that any argument or assessment of the security of a phone can be dismissed by virtue of the halting problem. If you'd like to retract that, fair enough. If not, you are staking out what I believe is a silly and unserious position. Is this a position you hold or not?
- lisper 8y ago> You explicitly said (I quoted you verbatim about it more than once) that any argument or assessment of the security of a phone can be dismissed by virtue of the halting problem. No, I did not say that. You keep putting words in my mouth, starting with "an iOS image is a black obelisk fathomless to man". And yes, you did quote me, but you took the quote out of context and then twisted its meaning. Here is what I said: > I have a lot of reasons to justify my skepticism. I could write a paper (and maybe I should). But HN comments do not lend themselves well to long-form communications so I advanced what I thought would be a compact argument: a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation of the amount of effort required to audit iOS (which is just one component of an iPhone) would reveal that to be infeasible. Now, that calculation may have been way off. That entire argument may have been wrong. But I can always fall back on the fact that to prove that there are no security holes in iOS you would have to solve the halting problem (specifically, you would have to solve the lambda-equivalence problem, which reduces to the halting problem). So I'm pretty sure I'm on solid ground with at least some level of skepticism about the effectiveness of reverse engineering. That does not mean the same thing as "any argument or assessment of the security of a phone can be dismissed by virtue of the halting problem." If you don't understand that, I would be happy to try to explain the difference to you. But you have reached the limits of my patience with your straw-man arguments. Do it one more time and we're done. Life it too short.