3 ms·

> There are proofs that the network converges properly as long as people don't violate those conditions do you have a link to those proofs? i've seen proofs al

> There are proofs that the network converges properly as long as people don't violate those conditions do you have a link to those proofs? i've seen proofs already where underlying assumptions were something like "majority of nodes are honest" or "network is reliable", etc.

DennisP 8y ago
I'm not up to date but here's the Casper FFG paper, which says: > Accountable safety means that two conflicting checkpoints cannot both be finalized unless ≥1/3 of validators violate a slashing condition (meaning at least one third of the total deposit is lost). Plausible liveness means that, regardless of any previous events (e.g., slashing events, delayed blocks, censorship attacks, etc.), if ≥2/3 of validators follow the protocol, then it’s always possible to finalize a new checkpoint without any validator violating a slashing condition. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 So if more than a third of the stake violates a slashing condition, that does cause a problem, but only a temporary one since that stake is immediately destroyed. (An important improvement over just assuming majority honest nodes is that you can prove who violated any of the slashing conditions.) There's been a lot of work since that paper, much of it discussed at ethresear.ch. Casper FFG is the version currently heading for production; in the paper it's described as a finality layer adding security to proof of work. The original plan was to reduce PoW rewards by 80% once the FFG layer was added. The new design is a bit different and I think it relies less on the PoW layer, but I'm not sure how it all fits together. There's also Casper CBC, which is a more purist form of PoS they hope to implement later. That seems to be making good progress but it's still in the research phase.

3 ms·

> There are proofs that the network converges properly as long as people don't violate those conditions do you have a link to those proofs? i've seen proofs al

by keymone 8y ago

DennisP 8y ago
I'm not up to date but here's the Casper FFG paper, which says: > Accountable safety means that two conflicting checkpoints cannot both be finalized unless ≥1/3 of validators violate a slashing condition (meaning at least one third of the total deposit is lost). Plausible liveness means that, regardless of any previous events (e.g., slashing events, delayed blocks, censorship attacks, etc.), if ≥2/3 of validators follow the protocol, then it’s always possible to finalize a new checkpoint without any validator violating a slashing condition. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09437 So if more than a third of the stake violates a slashing condition, that does cause a problem, but only a temporary one since that stake is immediately destroyed. (An important improvement over just assuming majority honest nodes is that you can prove who violated any of the slashing conditions.) There's been a lot of work since that paper, much of it discussed at ethresear.ch. Casper FFG is the version currently heading for production; in the paper it's described as a finality layer adding security to proof of work. The original plan was to reduce PoW rewards by 80% once the FFG layer was added. The new design is a bit different and I think it relies less on the PoW layer, but I'm not sure how it all fits together. There's also Casper CBC, which is a more purist form of PoS they hope to implement later. That seems to be making good progress but it's still in the research phase.