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The page is graphics loaded page with floating paragraphs over a single "sheet of wallpaper" showing interior and exterior diagrams of the aircraft. I can see i

The page is graphics loaded page with floating paragraphs over a single "sheet of wallpaper" showing interior and exterior diagrams of the aircraft. I can see it not working worth a damn in any kind of Reader View. FWIW, nothing new here, but it's a good 3rd grade overview for the layperson. And I am a Boeing guy, through and through, but they screwed the pooch on this one. RIP, Lion Air 610. /Acey (me: FAA licensed dispatcher)

gumby 8y ago
I can't see how you can learn anything from it not in a reader view either. oh, and if you need any assistive technology (e.g. perhaps you're blind): tough luck!
- tapland 8y ago
  If you didn't read about it after the accident this seems like a pretty easy to understand explanation. Why couldn't anyone learn from it? It explains the issue pretty well in my opinion
  - gumby 8y ago
    Because it was little dribs of info you had to scroll between, all with a distracting backdrop.
sargun 8y ago
Can you point us to a better article?
- LeoPanthera 8y ago
  The Wikipedia article is quite good. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion_Air_Flight_610 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion_Air_Flight_610
- trevyn 8y ago
  Here’s the actual safety board report, including flight data recorder graphs: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/2018/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Preliminary%20Report.pdf http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/2018/20... Looks like there was a problem with the autopilot trim, likely due to a faulty sensor, and the pilot just needed to switch off the autopilot instead of fighting it — the previous flight of that aircraft experienced a similar issue, and they just turned the autopilot trim off and carried on normally. :( The graphs on PDF page 23 are particularly morbid, and you’ll note that two of the final auto nose-down commands are of longer duration than all the rest.
  - trevyn 8y ago
    Ah, this is quite good as well: https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/ https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for... Apparently it wasn’t the standard autopilot trim, but a special safety program specific to the 737 MAX. Which still is just a switch to disable, if you know that switch is there, or that there is a checklist for dealing with runaway trim, or that you’re aware that auto-trim commands are the reason your plane keeps nosing down...
    - caf 8y ago
      I think the most important point described in that article is that the MCAS trim, unlike the other kinds of elevator trim, isn't defeated by limit switches on the yoke - and that this critical information was not in the training or flight manual.
      - dotancohen 8y ago
        If true, then this right here is the problem root. Why isn't pilot limit respected with regard for the MCAS specifically? Are any other systems so independent? I remember years ago the Boeing folks claiming that the automated Airbuses would be dangerous because the pilot always knows best. So how did it come to this on a Boeing?
Havoc 8y ago
Yeah the layout is quite annoying

gumby 8y ago

I can't see how you can learn anything from it not in a reader view either. oh, and if you need any assistive technology (e.g. perhaps you're blind): tough luck!

tapland 8y ago
If you didn't read about it after the accident this seems like a pretty easy to understand explanation. Why couldn't anyone learn from it? It explains the issue pretty well in my opinion
- gumby 8y ago
  Because it was little dribs of info you had to scroll between, all with a distracting backdrop.

sargun 8y ago

Can you point us to a better article?

LeoPanthera 8y ago
The Wikipedia article is quite good. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion_Air_Flight_610 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion_Air_Flight_610
trevyn 8y ago
Here’s the actual safety board report, including flight data recorder graphs: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/2018/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Preliminary%20Report.pdf http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/pre/2018/20... Looks like there was a problem with the autopilot trim, likely due to a faulty sensor, and the pilot just needed to switch off the autopilot instead of fighting it — the previous flight of that aircraft experienced a similar issue, and they just turned the autopilot trim off and carried on normally. :( The graphs on PDF page 23 are particularly morbid, and you’ll note that two of the final auto nose-down commands are of longer duration than all the rest.
- trevyn 8y ago
  Ah, this is quite good as well: https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/ https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for... Apparently it wasn’t the standard autopilot trim, but a special safety program specific to the 737 MAX. Which still is just a switch to disable, if you know that switch is there, or that there is a checklist for dealing with runaway trim, or that you’re aware that auto-trim commands are the reason your plane keeps nosing down...
  - caf 8y ago
    I think the most important point described in that article is that the MCAS trim, unlike the other kinds of elevator trim, isn't defeated by limit switches on the yoke - and that this critical information was not in the training or flight manual.
    - dotancohen 8y ago
      If true, then this right here is the problem root. Why isn't pilot limit respected with regard for the MCAS specifically? Are any other systems so independent? I remember years ago the Boeing folks claiming that the automated Airbuses would be dangerous because the pilot always knows best. So how did it come to this on a Boeing?

Havoc 8y ago

Yeah the layout is quite annoying