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The scientific method was designed to study phenomenon and test observations empirically. There's an essential problem with using science to confirm or describe
by curo 8y ago
The scientific method was designed to study phenomenon and test observations empirically. There's an essential problem with using science to confirm or describe that in which phenomenon and confirmation is presented.
If you're talking about the neural correlates of consciousness, you're right that we're removing a lot of the mystery. But if you're talking about the mystery that is your own subjective being, then we may never solve that problem. As Susan Greenfield states, "we can't turn the water into wine"
Sam Harris does a great 5m summary on the hard problem of consciousness that's worth a watch:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CiaKm6PlpsQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CiaKm6PlpsQ
- trevyn 8y agoI'm saying there is no mystery -- that people invoke mystery as an avoidance tactic when they have cognitive dissonance about an otherwise well-established conclusion, or when they find some pleasure in invoking the unknown and philosophizing. There should be nothing mysterious in 2018 about a biological being that has an internal self-model, memory, and processes sensory stimuli and internal neural firings over time, both of which have a direct relation to the physical basis of that self-model. That is what self-awareness is. "Experience can't be explained by science because science only arises in experience" sounds profound but contributes nothing -- if you invalidate the content of your experience, then you no longer have any reliable axioms on which to build any argument whatsoever, and we might as well all go home. The Sam Harris video you linked makes a good point -- that we want an explanation of consciousness that intuitively makes sense. I'm saying that if you study enough AI and neuroscience, it does intuitively make sense. His counterexample of explaining the "brittleness of glass" is intuitively OK with us even if we don't actually personally understand all of the details of the molecular and atomic interactions, because it does not fundamentally challenge our beliefs of who we are. If there's some explanation of consciousness that does challenge our beliefs of who we are, you better believe you're going to need a more comprehensive and complex explanation before you're going to intuitively believe it.
- bencollier49 8y agoThis isn't meant as an ad-hominem, but it still staggers me when I see comments like this. There seems to be a class of people who are unable to see the gaping chasm left by science in its inability to describe the reasons for our ability to experience subjective consciousness. We would need a scientific revolution to understand it. Neuroscience has nothing to say; physics has little to say. The OP article makes the point that we haven't got near to cracking the problem. Personally, I think we have a category issue. We simply don't know what category to put consciousness in, and all attempts to solve it thus far have been category mistakes.
- trevyn 8y agoFrom the OP article: “Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms.” I wouldn’t call that “haven’t got near to cracking”, especially when the technologies needed to specify those closer mappings are clearly defined and already under development.
- bencollier49 8y agoThey make the point that they don't know if their entire perspective and approach is misconceived: "We cannot yet know whether today’s students will find the solution to the ‘problem of consciousness’ or whether the problem as currently set forth is simply misconceived." And all the while we're making that same category error: Mapping subjective experience to neural correlates. This is like someone claiming that they know how internal combustion works because when they push the pedal the car goes faster.
- trevyn 8y agoI mean, how would you concretely propose we make better progress on this?
- 8y ago
- mbrock 8y agohttp://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/t563en.html http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/t563en.html Tractatus 5.6.3 presents the metaphysical problem quite clearly. The perceiving subject is a limit of science, kind of like the big bang which is also fundamentally and inescapably mysterious. You cannot prove or disprove the simulation hypothesis. Of course we exist within a deep and unfathomable mystery, no matter how accurately we can make predictions with the differential equations of physical science. It’s all fundamentally mysterious and not admitting that is ridiculous.
- saalweachter 8y agoJust to point out, things like "what happened before the Big Bang?" are only beyond science until someone comes up with an experiment that tests a theory that encompasses what happened before the Big Bang. Math can prove things unprovable from a specific set of axioms, but in the physical sciences it's a matter of imagination. The question of what stars were made of was once unknowable; now it is a robust field of study. What happened before the Big Bang is unknowable... by current scientific understanding and techniques. Maybe once we unify physics or build colliders the size of solar systems it will become understandable; maybe not.
- trevyn 8y agoIt’s not mysterious or important, it’s just where we find ourselves. If we are literally unable to see outside the bounds of the universe or the simulation, it is irrelevant to our experience, because it does not change how we should act. Boggling the mind on the subject does not create larger meaning where literally none exists. Humans have an instinct to make things mysterious and more meaningful than they are because it drives their curiosity and need to explain, which drives their ability to predict, which fulfills the mandate of life to win competition for resources and grow. Introspecting and understanding the perceiver thus answers the question easily. Wittgenstein did not have fMRI machines.
- mbrock 8y agoI don’t make any claims about this mystery or try to deal with it in any pseudoscientific way. My stance is something like: empirical science is the functioning mode of investigating and predicting the patterns of observable reality, and there’s no other way of objective inquiry, but there are limits to objective inquiry and it’s proper to say that the existence of the objective and subjective reality is fundamentally mysterious while acknowledging that there is no point to “mysticism” beyond amusement or aesthetic inspiration in the form of awe. The regularity of physical law is also a mystery.
- naasking 8y ago> But if you're talking about the mystery that is your own subjective being, then we may never solve that problem. For your consideration: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...
- trevyn 8y agoThis is great, thank you! From the wikipedia article (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_schema_theory https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_schema_theory): “AST is a theory of how a machine insists it is more than a machine, even though it is not.” That would reflect a lot of the voices here! ;-)