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I'm uncomfortable with that for the same reason I'd be uncomfortable with "if you connect rocks in such-and-such a way, you have a computer." It's not a very en

by mcbits 8y ago

I'm uncomfortable with that for the same reason I'd be uncomfortable with "if you connect rocks in such-and-such a way, you have a computer." It's not a very enlightening explanation.

_Schizotypy 8y ago
Don't some rocks contain silicon, so really pure and doped rocks make a computer.
- trevyn 8y ago
  Exactly, and even if nobody has ever built it or written a formal proof that it would work, you can still imagine how it would work and prove it to your own mind. (This would work for a purely mechanical computer made out of rocks, too.) Personally, with enough knowledge about how modern AI works, and a reasonable understanding of the neuroscience literature, I feel there is no fundamental mystery to consciousness, only awe at the level of complexity harnessed.
- adrianN 8y ago
  That's the point. While the explanation might be technically correct, it is in no way precise enough to call it understanding.
Erlich_Bachman 8y ago
Thank you for that concise but clear explanation of what I always felt was lacking with many over-scientified views of profound subjects like consciousness. We don't push back those models because they are "uncomfortable", make us feel bad, or inferior, or anything like that - but because they are simply non-functional! There are many aspects and phenomena in the world, in human interactions, in my own consciousness - which are simply not explained by the reductionist view! "Based on some complicated network of neurons" is not good enough! I clearly have these phenomena and experience, and this "complicated network" explanation just gives no explanation at all really! While other less scientific models do. I'm like "sure, I can accept whatever science you can give me and become a fully logical being, but don't ask me to ignore obvious phenomena that I know I have and experience, that is just stupid!".
- trevyn 8y ago
  Your understanding of the reductionist view may be incomplete; it is very functional and there’s no need to ignore phenomena. Less scientific models can be simpler and functional, but that doesn't mean that they’re more correct.
  - Erlich_Bachman 8y ago
    In some areas reductionism is, most certainly, the best possible model. I just think it takes much wisdom to discern the areas where it is and where it is not.
- feanaro 8y ago
  People often mean different things when they say "reductionism". Sometimes they mean that the phenomenon under consideration is always reducible to a common set of basic physical underpinnings, which is something for which we have never conclusively observed a contradiction. Other times, they mean to say that the phenomenon in question can be well understood using a lower level set of abstractions than we initially considered and that there is no need for further abstraction. This is observably not true, i.e. the workings of an internal combustion engine are not practically modelled by combining a model for each of its individual atoms. I think consciousness might eventually be reducible in the first, but not in the second sense. Of course, crude initial models don't explain a lot, but I don't think that has much bearing on a thing being reducible.

by mcbits 8y ago

I'm uncomfortable with that for the same reason I'd be uncomfortable with "if you connect rocks in such-and-such a way, you have a computer." It's not a very enlightening explanation.

_Schizotypy 8y ago

Don't some rocks contain silicon, so really pure and doped rocks make a computer.

trevyn 8y ago
Exactly, and even if nobody has ever built it or written a formal proof that it would work, you can still imagine how it would work and prove it to your own mind. (This would work for a purely mechanical computer made out of rocks, too.) Personally, with enough knowledge about how modern AI works, and a reasonable understanding of the neuroscience literature, I feel there is no fundamental mystery to consciousness, only awe at the level of complexity harnessed.
adrianN 8y ago
That's the point. While the explanation might be technically correct, it is in no way precise enough to call it understanding.

Erlich_Bachman 8y ago

Thank you for that concise but clear explanation of what I always felt was lacking with many over-scientified views of profound subjects like consciousness. We don't push back those models because they are "uncomfortable", make us feel bad, or inferior, or anything like that - but because they are simply non-functional! There are many aspects and phenomena in the world, in human interactions, in my own consciousness - which are simply not explained by the reductionist view! "Based on some complicated network of neurons" is not good enough! I clearly have these phenomena and experience, and this "complicated network" explanation just gives no explanation at all really! While other less scientific models do. I'm like "sure, I can accept whatever science you can give me and become a fully logical being, but don't ask me to ignore obvious phenomena that I know I have and experience, that is just stupid!".

trevyn 8y ago
Your understanding of the reductionist view may be incomplete; it is very functional and there’s no need to ignore phenomena. Less scientific models can be simpler and functional, but that doesn't mean that they’re more correct.
- Erlich_Bachman 8y ago
  In some areas reductionism is, most certainly, the best possible model. I just think it takes much wisdom to discern the areas where it is and where it is not.
feanaro 8y ago
People often mean different things when they say "reductionism". Sometimes they mean that the phenomenon under consideration is always reducible to a common set of basic physical underpinnings, which is something for which we have never conclusively observed a contradiction. Other times, they mean to say that the phenomenon in question can be well understood using a lower level set of abstractions than we initially considered and that there is no need for further abstraction. This is observably not true, i.e. the workings of an internal combustion engine are not practically modelled by combining a model for each of its individual atoms. I think consciousness might eventually be reducible in the first, but not in the second sense. Of course, crude initial models don't explain a lot, but I don't think that has much bearing on a thing being reducible.