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The only way that we agree on what a color is is through its physical manifestation. This has worked for all of our existence because when you tell me to think
by liuhenry 16y ago
The only way that we agree on what a color is is through its physical manifestation. This has worked for all of our existence because when you tell me to think of green, we're referencing something that we both sense.
But this doesn't work if you convey "original" thought. If I imagine something, I can only describe it to you, and there's is no way to be sure you are experiencing what I imagined. What you experience is based on how you process that input and what you think of. Your brain may be set up completely differently from mine, so would they be compatible?
I guess the real question is, is it possible to agree on an idea without having a reference?
- extension 16y agoYour brain may be set up completely differently from mine, so would they be compatible? That's my point.. to even ponder whether or not we have the same idea in our heads, there has to be some objective form of the thought that is compatible with both of our brains. Then, assuming there was some miraculous way to get the thought into my head, I could compare it with my own thought to see if they match. If, however, brains are structurally unique to the point that thoughts are meaningless outside of the context of the particular brain that thinks them, then why is it interesting to ponder if our thoughts are the same or different? Of course they are different since the notion of their sameness is a non-sequitur. The notion that we use the former type of thoughts to think about colors, and that they are interchangeable -- that I could see red in the same way that you see green, while seeing actual green as something else -- is conceivable, but completely unnecessary to explain anything about the mind. You can simply remove that step and get a simpler and equally adequate theory to explain color vision, so why would we even contemplate the step existing?