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If we agree on both of those [..] The question is: how do you know that you agree on them? That he uses the same cultural naming convention to describe the exp

If we agree on both of those [..] The question is: how do you know that you agree on them? That he uses the same cultural naming convention to describe the experience does not mean the experience is the same. He may be a synesthete and you would never know it. what is left that could be meaningfully compared Why do you need to be able to 'meaningfully compare' something for it to be able to be different? My love for my girlfriend is obviously different from that of others for their significant others, because it is a patchwork of feelings tied up with innumerable impressions and memories. No two are alike. Yet I could not express the difference on any measurable scale. There's no reason to suppose once experience of 'a mere color' is any different. The memories colors evoke are unique and there is no 'raw experience' to separate from those memories. That's too simple a view of the human brain.

extension 16y ago
We can associate different memories with the color green, but we can't experience it as different colors while claiming it's the same color. The experience of green is, by definition, whatever goes on in your head when you look at green. If you scanned our brains, you might find different patterns of neurons firing, but there is no sense in calling either of those patterns anything besides "green".
- Confusion 16y ago
  The experience of green is, by definition, whatever goes on in your head when you look at green You never 'look at green'. You can only experience the impression of instances of green things or have thoughts involving the abstract concept 'green'. You may be looking at a traffic light that just turned green and anxiously press the pedal to reach your destination. Or in the context of a psychological experiment, you may be looking at a green square, while remembering what it was that you were supposed to do when you saw something green. In the same context, you may be asked to think of 'green'. However, that will evoke images of grass, traffic lights, a girlfriend's dress. What goes on inside your head when looking at these instances of something 'green', or thinking of 'green' is a jumble of things, none of which could be described as the 'raw experience' of 'looking at green'. On another note, not involving the actual experience: I was just reading the wikipedia entry on 'Grue and bleen'. It ends with: Kripke then argues for an interpretation of Wittgenstein as holding that it is not possible to state the meaning of a word. That's purely out of philosophical arguments concerning language. If you can not state the meaning of a word, then you can not agree upon your experiences of that word, firstly because you don't know what experience you are trying to relate and secondly because relating it requires other, vaguely defined, words. You may also be interested in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_blue_from_green_in_language http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_blue_from_green_...

extension 16y ago

We can associate different memories with the color green, but we can't experience it as different colors while claiming it's the same color. The experience of green is, by definition, whatever goes on in your head when you look at green. If you scanned our brains, you might find different patterns of neurons firing, but there is no sense in calling either of those patterns anything besides "green".

Confusion 16y ago
The experience of green is, by definition, whatever goes on in your head when you look at green You never 'look at green'. You can only experience the impression of instances of green things or have thoughts involving the abstract concept 'green'. You may be looking at a traffic light that just turned green and anxiously press the pedal to reach your destination. Or in the context of a psychological experiment, you may be looking at a green square, while remembering what it was that you were supposed to do when you saw something green. In the same context, you may be asked to think of 'green'. However, that will evoke images of grass, traffic lights, a girlfriend's dress. What goes on inside your head when looking at these instances of something 'green', or thinking of 'green' is a jumble of things, none of which could be described as the 'raw experience' of 'looking at green'. On another note, not involving the actual experience: I was just reading the wikipedia entry on 'Grue and bleen'. It ends with: Kripke then argues for an interpretation of Wittgenstein as holding that it is not possible to state the meaning of a word. That's purely out of philosophical arguments concerning language. If you can not state the meaning of a word, then you can not agree upon your experiences of that word, firstly because you don't know what experience you are trying to relate and secondly because relating it requires other, vaguely defined, words. You may also be interested in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_blue_from_green_in_language http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_blue_from_green_...