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I see where you're coming from but neither tor-browser, tails or a portal is going to protect users that don't rtfm. If you use the tor-browser you still want t
by DyslexicAtheist 8y ago
I see where you're coming from but neither tor-browser, tails or a portal is going to protect users that don't rtfm. If you use the tor-browser you still want to avoid checking email or starting services over that same channel that will leak your identity. this are basic tor guidelines and the documentation even warns users of this.
the typical users for a portal are people with prior training of opsec (yes you need to train opsec all the time because it's not just the tools but your whole workflow that's gonna trip you up) and a real use-case.
I assume if you use this you won't make such rookie mistakes like having services running that will leak identity. It's perfect for journalists, activists or anyone else that already uses hardware based compartmentalization. This is an additional layer - not a silver bullet. I really assume a portal user already knows what things to isolate, which processes may run, what part of their work (during an operation) needs to be airgap'ed and hence shouldn't go through a portal ...
- DyslexicAtheist 8y agoPS: I'd trust hardware based compartmentalization like this any day over the QubesOS nonsense.