4 ms·

> what shapes fit in what wooden holes > ontology We must be talking past each other, or something. For context, for other readers -- > Traditionally listed

> what shapes fit in what wooden holes > ontology We must be talking past each other, or something. For context, for other readers -- > Traditionally listed as the core of metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities may be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Ontology_(Being) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Ontology_(Being)

dvt 8y ago
> We must be talking past each other, or something. I guess we are. According to you, when my cousins go to Six Flags, they're doing fluid mechanics. Forgive me if I don't buy that.
- NotAnEconomist 8y ago
  It's literally ontology -- they're discovering the idea of shape as a concept, which is an equivalence of structural forms, which is an ontological concept. I mean, I get that you don't like that because it proves my point, and that's why you're making really silly comparisons. But to answer -- yes, most children at water parks also are figuring out fluid mechanics at a simple level, eg drag or interference.
  - naasking 8y ago
    > It's literally ontology -- they're discovering the idea of shape as a concept, which is an equivalence of structural forms, which is an ontological concept. I think there's an important difference between the implicit, intuitive, relational knowledge that we build via direct interaction, and philosophical knowledge that the other poster is thinking talking about (and presumably, what ontology is about). You're equating the two without arguing why we should consider them the same. At best, our implicit model of the world knowledge informs our intuitions on some philosophical concepts, but that still doesn't entail this knowledge is the same as philosophical knowledge.
    - NotAnEconomist 8y ago
      > I think there's an important difference between the implicit, intuitive, relational knowledge that we build via direct interaction, and philosophical knowledge that the other poster is thinking talking about In the same sense that there's a distinction between counting and mathematics, or throwing things and physics, or conversations and psychology, or various other academic disciplines -- that is to say, a very artificial one. In every topic, people think about them as a routine course of events -- they just form very simple effective theories on the subject, because their life doesn't require a more advanced one. "Physics" the academic subject is just a very advanced version of the intuition you build about throwing balls, smashing rocks, walking on ice, and not jumping out of windows. Similarly, your argument seems deeply confused: The burden of proof is on the people asserting that an arbitrary distinction in what's clearly a spectrum of things is meaningful. In this case, it falls to you to show that there's a meaningful difference in kind between the sorts of thoughts a child is having about ontology (eg, that a positive version of a shape and a negative version of a shape are the same "shape") and whatever other example you want to use. Each of you has clearly admitted that they're on the spectrum of ontological thought, because that's why you recognize it so clearly as an example, then just had special pleading of "Well, simple ontology shouldn't really count as ontology, because that would make me wrong." So again, we see that philosophy is useful -- the "burden of proof" is a philosophical concept that lets me just reply, "No, how about you show that splitting ontological thought into 'true ontology' and 'not really ontology' is useful in the first place."
      - hackinthebochs 8y ago
        That playing with blocks is a precursor to theorizing about what exists does not justify a field that purports to make true statements about what exists. Similarly, throwing a football around does not justify a field that purports to describe the behavior of entities in the world. These practices need external justification. The point is that the substantive content of the field of metaphysics has no such justification.
        NotAnEconomist 8y ago

dvt 8y ago

> We must be talking past each other, or something. I guess we are. According to you, when my cousins go to Six Flags, they're doing fluid mechanics. Forgive me if I don't buy that.

NotAnEconomist 8y ago
It's literally ontology -- they're discovering the idea of shape as a concept, which is an equivalence of structural forms, which is an ontological concept. I mean, I get that you don't like that because it proves my point, and that's why you're making really silly comparisons. But to answer -- yes, most children at water parks also are figuring out fluid mechanics at a simple level, eg drag or interference.
- naasking 8y ago
  > It's literally ontology -- they're discovering the idea of shape as a concept, which is an equivalence of structural forms, which is an ontological concept. I think there's an important difference between the implicit, intuitive, relational knowledge that we build via direct interaction, and philosophical knowledge that the other poster is thinking talking about (and presumably, what ontology is about). You're equating the two without arguing why we should consider them the same. At best, our implicit model of the world knowledge informs our intuitions on some philosophical concepts, but that still doesn't entail this knowledge is the same as philosophical knowledge.
  - NotAnEconomist 8y ago
    > I think there's an important difference between the implicit, intuitive, relational knowledge that we build via direct interaction, and philosophical knowledge that the other poster is thinking talking about In the same sense that there's a distinction between counting and mathematics, or throwing things and physics, or conversations and psychology, or various other academic disciplines -- that is to say, a very artificial one. In every topic, people think about them as a routine course of events -- they just form very simple effective theories on the subject, because their life doesn't require a more advanced one. "Physics" the academic subject is just a very advanced version of the intuition you build about throwing balls, smashing rocks, walking on ice, and not jumping out of windows. Similarly, your argument seems deeply confused: The burden of proof is on the people asserting that an arbitrary distinction in what's clearly a spectrum of things is meaningful. In this case, it falls to you to show that there's a meaningful difference in kind between the sorts of thoughts a child is having about ontology (eg, that a positive version of a shape and a negative version of a shape are the same "shape") and whatever other example you want to use. Each of you has clearly admitted that they're on the spectrum of ontological thought, because that's why you recognize it so clearly as an example, then just had special pleading of "Well, simple ontology shouldn't really count as ontology, because that would make me wrong." So again, we see that philosophy is useful -- the "burden of proof" is a philosophical concept that lets me just reply, "No, how about you show that splitting ontological thought into 'true ontology' and 'not really ontology' is useful in the first place."
    - hackinthebochs 8y ago
      That playing with blocks is a precursor to theorizing about what exists does not justify a field that purports to make true statements about what exists. Similarly, throwing a football around does not justify a field that purports to describe the behavior of entities in the world. These practices need external justification. The point is that the substantive content of the field of metaphysics has no such justification.
      - NotAnEconomist 8y ago