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It's weird that you take this stance. It almost feels like you're implying that ProtonMail is a bad actor, and end to end encryption is bad because 'civic duty'
by dannyw 8y ago
It's weird that you take this stance. It almost feels like you're implying that ProtonMail is a bad actor, and end to end encryption is bad because 'civic duty'. That's like "but terrorism".
I understand that you're not a privacy-first company, but still, your communications haven't been reassuring me. There is extensive documentation (e.g. Yahoo FISA) that ALL content not end-to-end-encrypted is ingested for bulk surveillance and decades-long (if not infinite) retention.
The only solution is 100% end to end encryption, with NO mechanism for unauthorised access (including law enforcement). Like iMessage and Signal. Anything partial of that, while saying you are pro-privacy, is IMHO harmful to privacy.
- bad_user 8y agoMost email being transmitted on the Internet is in unencrypted form. Most people are not on ProtonMail and do not have a PGP key published. If I were to guess, I’d say that 99%+ emails sent or received by ProtonMail customers are seen by ProtonMail’s servers in unencrypted form.
- kwhitefoot 8y ago> Most email being transmitted on the Internet is in unencrypted form. Really? I use Hotmail, GMail, and Yahoo, and all of these use TLS so it is encrypted in transit.
- grincho 8y agoiMessages are encrypted, but it's Apple who hands the client one or more public keys with which to encrypt them—and that's each time; there is no key pinning. They could easily hand you a public key whose private key they or another malicious party knows. See https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 and especially page 58 of the linked https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf.